United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant Queenbee LLC's Motion to Dismiss
for failure to state a claim. (Mot. to Dismiss
(“Mot.”), ECF No. 13.) For the following reasons,
Queenbee's Motion is GRANTED.
Dwain Lammey is a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for
mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Queenbee owns real
property located at 608 E. Manchester Avenue, Los Angeles,
California. (Compl. ¶ 2.) In March 2019, Lammey went to
Queenbee's property to eat at a restaurant open to the
public, motivated in part to determine if Queenbee complied
with disability access laws. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Lammey
alleges that on the date of his visit, Queenbee did not
provide accessible paths of travel in conformance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
Standards. (Compl. ¶ 11.) In a footnote in his
Complaint, Lammey elaborates that “there was no safe
wheelchair accessible route of travel from the boundary of
the site to the accessible entrance of the restaurant.”
(Compl. ¶ 11 n.1.)
claims he personally encountered this barrier, and the lack
of accessible paths of travel created difficulty and
discomfort for him. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15.) Lammey
alleges that, because Queenbee failed to provide accessible
paths of travel, Queenbee denied him full and equal access.
(Compl. ¶ 14.) According to Lammey, the barriers are
easily removable and, if complete removal is not achievable,
numerous alternative accommodations can be made to provide
greater access. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Lammey further alleges
that his knowledge of the existing barriers and uncertainty
about the existence of other barriers deters him from
returning to the restaurant. (Compl. ¶ 18.)
on these allegations, Lammey asserts two causes of action:
(1) violation of the ADA; and (2) violation of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act (“Unruh”). (Compl. ¶¶
22-30.) Queenbee moves to dismiss Lammey's Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. 1.)
may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a
cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to
support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need
only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2)-a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter
v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual
“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
determination of whether a complaint satisfies the
plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A
court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe
all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . .
. as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the
plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,
679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept
conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and
unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
contends that Lammey does not allege any architectural
barriers that constitute discrimination under the ADA; thus,
Lammey fails to give Queenbee fair notice as Rule 8 requires.
(Mot. 1.) On that basis, Queenbee moves to dismiss
Lammey's Complaint for a failure to state a claim. (Mot.
Violation of the ADA
alleges that Queenbee failed to provide accessible paths of
travel, in ...