United States District Court, E.D. California
L. Nunley United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Marilyn Cook's
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.
(ECF No. 5.) The Government filed an opposition. (ECF No. 6.)
After carefully considering the parties' arguments and
for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES
Factual and Procedural Background
charges in this case arise from Defendant's alleged
filing of false claims for property held by the California
State Controller's Division of Unclaimed Property on
behalf of the United States Marshals Services and others.
(ECF No. 1.) On July 25, 2019, a federal grand jury returned
an eight-count indictment charging Defendant with six counts
of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, one
count of wrongfully using a government seal in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1017, and one count of aggravated identity
theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). (ECF No.
6 at 1.)
time the grand jury returned the instant indictment,
Defendant was in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial
detention order and was scheduled to begin trial on distinct
charges in the Eastern District of Tennessee. (ECF No. 6-3.)
On July 31, 2019, a jury found Defendant guilty of presenting
a fictitious financial instrument in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 514(a)(2) and presenting a false claim to the United
States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287(a). (ECF No. 6 at
2.) A sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 3, 2019.
Government alleges that it promptly notified Defendant of the
indictment pending in the Eastern District of California.
(Id.) On September 6, 2019, Defendant filed a
document labeled “Motion for Speedy Trial”
wherein Defendant “move[d] the Court for the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.” (ECF No. 4.) On
December 2, 2019, Defendant, proceeding pro se,
filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment based on a
violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
(ECF No. 5.)
Standard of Law
Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The
right to a speedy trial attaches when a criminal proceeding
is initiated, including when the defendant is
indicted.” United States v. Myers, 930 F.3d
1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019).
determining when the constitutional right is violated, the
Supreme Court has rejected any rigid approaches or clearly
defined rules.” Id. “Instead, the Court
has adopted ‘a balancing test, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.'” Id. (citing Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). The Barker
test establishes four factors to be balanced: “Length
of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.” 407 U.S. at 530.
court balances all four of these factors in a practical,
case-by-case analysis under Barker.”
Myers, 930 F.3d at 1120. “As the Court
explained, none of the four factors is ‘either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are
related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant.'”
Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
summarily argues that the Government violated her Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. (ECF No. 5.) She states
that she received the indictment by mail on August 8, 2019,
while in custody at a detention facility in Tennessee and
filed a motion for a speedy trial on August 25, 2019.
(Id.) Defendant's motion to dismiss lacks any
other facts or legal arguments. In opposition, the Government
applies Barker and argues it did not violate
Defendant's right to a speedy trial. (ECF No. 6.) The
Court will address the Barker factors in turn.
Length of Delay
length of delay is the threshold factor.”
Myers, 930 F.3d at 1119. “[T]o trigger a
speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the
interval between accusation and trial has crossed the
threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively
prejudicial' delay, since, by definition, he cannot
complain that the government has denied him a
‘speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his
case with customary promptness.” Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) (citation omitted).
“[B]ecause of the imprecision of the right to speedy
trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry
is necessarily dependent upon ...