United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY OR BIFURCATE
DISCOVERY Re: Dkt. Nos. 39, 40
Maxine
M. Chesney United States District Judge.
Before
the Court are two motions: (1) defendant's "Motion
to Dismiss," filed October 28, 2019; and (2)
defendant's "Motion to Stay Discovery . . ., and in
the Alternative, to Bifurcate Discovery," filed October
28, 2019. Both motions have been fully briefed.[1] Having read and
considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition
to the motions, the Court rules as follows.[2]
BACKGROUND
For
purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes the
following allegations in the operative complaint, the First
Amended Complaint ("FAC"), are true.
Plaintiff
Eduardo Peña "obtained status under DACA
[Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals] along with a Social
Security number and federal work authorization in or around
2012" and "[h]e has since renewed his DACA status
three times." (See FAC ¶ 9.) He presently
is employed as a "tax manager." (See FAC
¶ 8.)
"In
or around November 2018," plaintiff "submitted an
online application for an auto loan through the Wells Fargo
website," and, "[w]hen the online application
requested that he enter his citizenship status," he
selected "non-resident alien." (See FAC
¶ 49.) "At some point after [plaintiff] submitted
his application," defendant "conducted a hard
credit check and pull of his consumer report from one or more
credit bureaus." (See FAC ¶ 50.) At
another point after he submitted his application, plaintiff
"received a phone call from a Wells Fargo representative
to process the loan" and said representative
"provided him with additional paperwork to complete and
asked him for a copy of his Social Security card."
(See FAC ¶ 51.) After plaintiff provided his
Social Security card, the representative then asked him for
"a copy of his work permit," which plaintiff also
provided. (See id.) Thereafter, the representative
told plaintiff he was "ineligible for the loan because
his DACA status expired within the loan period" (see
id.); plaintiff's "creditworthiness" was
"not consider[ed]" (see FAC ¶ 52.)
Although plaintiff subsequently requested defendant send him
a "written explanation" for the denial, he did not
receive an explanation that "accurately stated the
reason." (See FAC ¶ 53.)
Based
on said allegations, plaintiff alleges three claims for
relief, specifically, (1) "Alienage Discrimination (42
U.S.C. § 1981)"; (2) "Failure to Provide
Written Notice of Reason for Denial (ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §
1691 and 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(a))"; and (3)
"Obtaining Consumer Reports Without a Permissible
Purpose (FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f))."
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Dismiss
The
Court considers plaintiff's three claims, in turn.
1.
First Claim: Alienage Discrimination
In the
First Claim for Relief, plaintiff alleges defendant's
denial of his application for an automobile loan violated 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which statute provides, in relevant part,
that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed
by white citizens." See 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a). Section 1981 "protect[s] primarily against
racial discrimination" but also "protects against
discrimination on the basis of alienage." See Sagana
v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 2004).
At the
outset, the Court notes that several issues bearing on
plaintiff's § 1981 claim are not directly addressed
by the parties in their respective submissions, and,
consequently, the Court, without making a finding herein as
to how such issues should be resolved, assumes the following:
(1) aliens protected by § 1981 are aliens who are
lawfully present in the country, see Anderson v.
Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 180 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding
"[i]f an employer refuses to hire a person because that
person is in the country illegally, that employer is
discriminating on the basis not of alienage but of
noncompliance with federal law"); (2) DACA recipients
are considered to be lawfully in the country, see Arizona
Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2014 (observing Department of Homeland Security
"considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully present
in the United States"); and (3) the length of the loan
plaintiff sought from defendant extended beyond the date his
DACA status would expire if not renewed (see FAC
¶ 51).
Next,
it is undisputed that, if a person is "approved into the
DACA program," the person is "granted a renewable
two-year term of deferred action." See Regents of
the University of California v. United States Department of
Homeland Security, 908 F.3d 476, 490 (9th Cir. 2018).
Stated otherwise, all DACA recipients must seek a renewal
every two years. In light of the factual allegations in the
FAC, "accept[ed] as true," see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), as well as the
assumptions identified above, the Court finds defendant's
denial of plaintiff's application, allegedly based on a
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