United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States
District Judge.
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Proceedings:
(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action
On
November 7, 2019, Mehrnaz Assef (“plaintiff”)
filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court
against Johnson and Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Inc. (collectively, “Johnson defendants”) and
Imerys Talc America, Inc. (collectively,
“defendants”). (See Dkt. 1, Notice of
Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1). On December 13,
2019, the Johnson defendants removed that action on diversity
jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
(See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 7). Having reviewed the
NOR, the court hereby remands this action to state court for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).
LEGAL
STANDARD
“Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are
presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861
(2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction
sua sponte before proceeding to the merits of a
case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the
absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244
(2006).
“The
right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit
commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is
shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.”
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.
28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of
removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are
strictly construed against removal
jurisdiction.[1] See id. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district
court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v.
Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). A
removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that
removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem.
Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical
rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing
defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d
564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always
has the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
if there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in
favor of remanding the action to state court. See
Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must
be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal
in the first instance.”).
“Under
the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to
remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing
defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter
jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta
Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370.
Failure to do so requires that the case be remanded, as
“[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and.
. . the district court must remand if it lacks
jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n,
Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th
Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross &
Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It
is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at
anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive
pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing
court.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district
court may remand an action where the court finds that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua
sponte).
DISCUSSION
The
court's review of the NOR and the attached Complaint
makes clear that this court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words,
plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in
federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts
supplying diversity jurisdiction.[2] Therefore, removal was
improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107
S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that
originally could have been filed in federal court may be
removed to federal court by the defendant.”) (footnote
omitted).
Defendants
bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional
threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d
1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (“Where it is not facially
evident from the complaint that more than $75, 000 is in
controversy, the removing party must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the
right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state
court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is no basis
for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy
does not appear to exceed the diversity jurisdiction
threshold of $75, 000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332.[3]
As an
initial matter, the amount of damages plaintiff seeks cannot
be determined from the Complaint, as the Complaint does not
set forth a specific amount. (See,
generally, Dkt. 1-2, Complaint at ECF 45-46; Dkt. 1,
NOR at ¶ 20). The Johnson defendants rely on the nature
of the complaint to show that the amount in controversy is
met. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 21-24).
However, the Johnson defendants proffer no evidence that
might help the court determine whether plaintiff's claims
would satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.
(See, generally, id.). The Johnson
defendants merely cite to plaintiff's alleged injuries
and requested forms of relief as proof, ipso facto,
that the amount plaintiff seeks would meet the amount in
controversy requirement. (See id.). Such an
unsubstantiated assertion, untethered to any evidence, cannot
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of §
1332(a). See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (remanding for
lack of diversity jurisdiction where defendant “offered
no facts whatsoever . . . [to] overcome[ ] the strong
presumption against removal jurisdiction, [and did not]
satisf[y] [defendant's] burden of setting forth . . . the
underlying facts supporting its assertion that the
amount in controversy exceeds [$75, 000].”) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
In sum,
given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding
the action, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is
not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendants
have met their burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy meets the
jurisdictional threshold. See Matheson, 319 F.3d at
1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the
complaint that more than $75, 000 is in controversy, the
removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the
jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to
removal exists, a case should be remanded to state
court.”); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117 (same).
This
order is not intended . Nor is it intended to be included in
or submitted to any online ...