United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSING
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A
COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (ECF NOS. 1,
5)
Plaintiff
Alfred Arroyos (“Plaintiff”) is an incarcerated
individual proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This matter was referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff's complaint in this action
was filed on November 5, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) On November 18,
2019, a screening order was filed finding that Plaintiff had
failed to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff
was granted thirty days in which to file an amended
complaint. (Id.)
I.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail[] to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek[]
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002).
Prisoners
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are
entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to
have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must
be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual
detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that
are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
II.
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
The
Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as
true only for the purpose of the sua sponte
screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
In the
caption page, Plaintiff names the Madera District Attorney,
Madera Superior Court, and Madera County Adult Probation as
defendants in this action, apparently referring to the
entities as a whole. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)[1] Plaintiff then
names the following individual defendants in this action: (1)
Sally Moreno, identified as the District Attorney for the
County of Madera; (2) Mitchell Rigby, identified as a judge
for the Madera County Superior Court; (3) Dale Blea,
identified as a judge for the Madera County Superior Court;
(4) Jose Pantoja, identified as a Deputy Chief Probation
Officer at Madera County Adult Probation; (5) Cristen Aganza,
identified as a probation officer at Madera County Adult
Probation; and (6) Abel Perez, identified as a probation
officer at Madera County Adult Probation. (Compl. 2-3.)
A.
Claim One for Illegal Sentence
Plaintiff
complains he was subject to an illegal sentence pursuant to
California Penal Code Section 3456(a)(3). (Compl. 4.) On July
26, 2019, he was arrested for violation of post-release
community supervision and on August 13, 2019, he was
sentenced to 180 days for failing to report in compliance
with California Penal Code Section 3455(b)(1). (Id.)
On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff's defense counsel
petitioned the state court to recall the sentence for lack of
jurisdiction. (Id.) Plaintiff states that according
to the petition for revocation of community supervision in
case no. MCR058346, Plaintiff was placed on supervision on
November 28, 2016, and his first alleged violation occurred
on January 10, 2018. (Id.) According to all previous
revocation petitions, Plaintiff did not have any violations
or other infractions before January 10, 2018, and thus argues
each defendant lacked jurisdiction over his person.
(Id.) Plaintiff also references a petition to revoke
an illegal sentence filed in the state court action by his
defense counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff states a petition
was granted by Judge Dale Blea.[2] Plaintiff claims he was injured
by false imprisonment, defamation of character, and suffered
other collateral damages. (Id.) Plaintiff states he
did not seek a request for administrative relief due to
inadequacy of access to legal assistance. (Id.)
B.
Claim Two for False Imprisonment
On
November 28, 2016, Plaintiff was released on community
supervision, and states on December 28, 2017, he was supposed
to have been discharged from supervision. (Compl. 5.)
Plaintiff advised his first probation officer, Defendant Abel
Perez, and his second probation officer, Cristen Aganza, that
Plaintiff should have already been discharged due to thirteen
(13) months of good conduct. (Compl. 5, 10.) Plaintiff claims
that both probation officers advised Plaintiff that he had to
complete three (3) years of supervision because he was a
high-risk offender, however, Plaintiff claims the nature of
his previous conviction was not a violent offense and that
was actually why he was on community supervision and not on
parole. (Id.) Plaintiff states that all defendants
and everyone within their institutions are responsible for
violating his personal liberty and causing his confinement
whether directly or indirectly, because all defendants had no
jurisdiction over Plaintiff after December 28, 2017, when
supervision should have been terminated. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that the Madera Superior Court and the
Madera District Attorney upheld each conviction after January
10, 2018, leading to confinement, and the Madera County Adult
Probation held Plaintiff to terms and conditions under their
jurisdiction when they had no right to do so. (Id.)
As for injury, Plaintiff states that while confined in Madera
County Jail, he was constantly harassed by the Madera
Probation officers and the Madera Police Department, which
endangered his well-being as well as the safety and security
of his family members, and caused him loss of employment, and
emotional damages. Plaintiff states he did not seek a request
for administrative relief due to inadequacy of access to
legal assistance. (Id.)
C.
Claim Three for Deliberate Indifference to Right to
Justice
Plaintiff
claims that each defendant, individually and in their
official capacities, violated his constitutional and civil
rights by imposing judgments that were defective for lack of
jurisdiction. (Compl. 6.) Plaintiff states that the extreme
negligence and deliberate indifference of the defendants
caused the Plaintiff's harm and suffering. (Id.)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while in custody because
of the supervised release violation, in the maximum-security
module, Plaintiff was assaulted and brutally beaten while he
showered by multiple inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff was
dragged out of the shower and the inmates continued to beat
him. (Id.) Plaintiff states that three of the
inmates are currently being prosecuted for murder.
(Id.) Plaintiff needed a staple to the top of his
skull, had extreme swelling to the face and head, had black
eyes, and injured lips. (Id.) Plaintiff also seems
to allege defendants jeopardized the safety and security of
himself and family, that he was harassed at work, and
suffered loss of employment and wages due to these forms of
judicial abuse. (Id.) Plaintiff states he did not
seek a request for administrative relief due to inadequacy of
access to legal assistance. (Id.)
In an
attached declaration, Plaintiff also avers to harassment by
Madera County Probation officers, Madera County police
officers, and states this was “especially” done
by Madera Gang Task Force officers Gonzalez, and Ryan
Vasquez, by utilizing supervised release terms and
conditions. (Compl. 12-13.) Plaintiff does not name any of
these officers in his complaint.
III.
DISCUSSION
The
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable
claim in the action for the reasons stated herein. Given
Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court shall
outline the applicable legal standards and grant Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint to address the
deficiencies discussed below.
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Pursuant
to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual allegations are
not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citation omitted). This is because, while factual
allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.
Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Therefore, Plaintiff must set
forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
pleadings of pro se prisoners are construed
liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt.
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
In this
case, while Plaintiff has alleged some specific factual
allegations, a number of Plaintiff's allegations amount
to no more than generalized conclusions that Defendants
violated his rights that are unsupported by any facts, and
Plaintiff fails to plead any facts concerning actions of a
number of named defendants. For example, Plaintiff's
complaint only contains allegations as to three of the six
individually named defendants in the body of the complaint,
does not refer to any specific individual defendant in claim
number three, and repeatedly makes general conclusory
statements as to why each defendant has violated his rights
without specifically describing how those defendants did so.
Where
Plaintiff does make reference to specific individuals, the
factual details are lacking. For example, Plaintiff's
only reference to Defendant Judge Dale Blea states that he
granted a petition in state court. (Compl. 4.)[3] Plaintiff's
only other references to individual defendants in the body of
the complaint concern Defendants Cristen Aganza and Abel
Perez, Plaintiff's first and second probation officers.
As to these defendants, Plaintiff only alleges that he
informed them that he should no longer be on probation due to
thirteen months of good conduct, that he had been classified
incorrectly, and that these defendants disagreed, incorrectly
stating he was a high-risk offender. (Compl. 5, 10.) These
officers then appear to have been involved in petitions for
revocation of probation based on violations during this time
period.
Plaintiff's
conclusory statements do not suffice to state a claim against
Defendants Sally Moreno, Mitchell Rigby, Dale Blea, or Jose
Pantoja. Further, while Plaintiff does provide some factual
detail concerning what Defendants Cristen Aganza and Abel
Perez did, there is not enough detail for the Court to
reasonably infer that any conduct would constitute a
constitutional violation or whether these defendants would be
subject to immunity, as discussed below.
Further,
as currently pled, Plaintiff's complaint does not contain
enough factual content to “give the defendant[s] fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Since
Plaintiff fails to identify which specific defendants are
referred to when he repeatedly refers to “Defendants,
” Plaintiff's complaint fails to give fair notice
of all of the allegations and claims directed against each
separately named defendant. Gauvin v. Trombatore,
682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“Plaintiff
must allege the basis of his claim against each
defendant to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2)[.]” (italics added)); see also Van Dyke
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