United States District Court, N.D. California
KENNETH E. BAPTISTE, Plaintiff,
B. MARTINEZ, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND; DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION RE: DKT. NO.
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
an inmate at California Training Facility - Central
(“CTF”), filed this pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His amended
complaint (Dkt. No. 7) is now before the Court for review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any
case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court
must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims
which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings
must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica
Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to
provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment]
to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and
(2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under
the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
amended complaint names the following CTF-Central prison
officials as defendants: Correctional Counselor II B.
Martinez, staff psychologist DeAntoni, Sr. Psychologist Wynn,
Chief of Mental Health J. Howlin, and Warden Hatton. The
amended complaint also names as a defendant California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Healthcare
Services Deputy Director of Policy and Risk Management J.
Lewis. Dkt. No. 7 at 3.
amended complaint makes the following allegations. Plaintiff
is a participant in the Mental Health Placement program
(CCCMS) for a mental disorder. On June 22, 2016, Defendant
Martinez, in his capacity as the chairperson of
plaintiff's initial classification hearing, denied
plaintiff's request to have his single cell status
reinstated “in spite of all the relevant case factors
and established policies to the contrary.” On August 3,
2016, at plaintiff's initial treatment team housing /
program recommendation hearing, Defendants DeAntoni, Wynn and
Howlin also denied plaintiff's request for single cell
status despite plaintiff's mental health concerns and
their constitutional and ethical obligations. Defendant Lewis
reviewed this matter and Defendant Hatton was aware of this
matter, but these defendants also failed to reinstate
plaintiff's single-cell status. As relief, Plaintiff
seeks the reinstatement of his single-cell status. Dkt. No.
amended complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend
because it does not allege the violation of federal
constitutional or statutory rights. In filing an amended
complaint, plaintiff should specify what federal
constitutional or statutory right was violated by the denial
of single-cell status, and how the denial violated that
federal constitutional or statutory right.
Motion for Relief From Order
has filed a motion for relief from order pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (6). Dkt. No. 8. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)
provides for relief from a final order. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The Court's November 6, 2019 order denying
plaintiff's request for an ex parte preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order was not a final
order. Accordingly, the Court construes this motion as a
renewed motion for a temporary restraining order. In this
renewed motion, plaintiff alleges that he should be granted
an ex parte temporary restraining order for the
reasons set forth in his original motion (Dkt. No. 3) and
because he has been housed in a single-cell since April 2017
despite not having single-cell status, a fact which he had
omitted to tell the Court previously. The fact that plaintiff
has been housed in a single-cell since April 2017 despite not
having single-cell status weighs against granting a temporary
restraining order. A temporary restraining order may be
granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party
or that party's attorney only if: (1) it clearly appears
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or
damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party
or the party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and
(2) the applicant's attorney certifies in writing the
efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the
reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be
required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Here, plaintiff
alleges that he does not have single-cell status and will be
at risk if double-celled. However, despite not having
single-cell status, plaintiff has been housed in a single
cell for over two years, indicating that the alleged
potential injury is not ...