United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CAROLYN K. DELANEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Noble BernisEarl McGill El Bey is proceeding without counsel
in this action. His first complaint was dismissed with leave
to amend. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff filed his first amended
complaint (“FAC”), which is presently before the
court. (ECF No. 4.) The federal in forma pauperis statute
authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is
legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint
must contain more than “naked assertions, ”
“labels and conclusions, ” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the
court can grant relief must have facial plausibility.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as
true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283
pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
1988). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the
defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in
forma pauperis is ordinarily entitled to notice and an
opportunity to amend before dismissal. See Noll v.
Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)
superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc);
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.
names four defendants: the California Highway Patrol,
California Department of Motor Vehicles, Officer A. Diaz, and
Officer Danny Leece. The complaint alleges that plaintiff was
pulled over by Officer A. Diaz, who issued plaintiff a
citation for failure to have a proper vehicle registration
plate. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) Plaintiff then went to the Tracy
Highway Patrol Office where Officer Leece informed plaintiff
that California does not recognize his indigenous plates.
claims that he was not in California Highway Patrol's
jurisdiction as a result of his status as an Indigenous
Aboriginal Moorish American National. (Id.)
Plaintiff additionally alleges that “No Law requires
you to record / pledge your private automobile, ” cites
to the UCC, the criminal code, the Illinois Supreme Court,
and the “Proclamation, Ancient Imperial Moors Are Out
of Interregnum.” (Id.) Plaintiff's FAC
suffers from similar defects the court outlined in dismissing
his original complaint. (See ECF No. 3.)
initial matter, plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which
relief can be granted premised on 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242, as these federal criminal statutes confer neither any
substantive rights nor any private rights to bring a civil
action for damages. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d
1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
plaintiff cannot state a claim premised on the assertion that
California officers, while in California, lacked jurisdiction
over plaintiff, or any similar claim of sovereign immunity.
The United States has not recognized the Moorish Nation as a
sovereign state. See Ingram El v. Crail, 2019 WL
3860192, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019) (“[T]he United
States has not recognized the sovereignty of the Moorish
Nation, thus precluding sovereign immunity claims”
(quoting Khattab El v. U.S. Justice Dep't, 1988
WL 5117, at 5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1988)); Benton-El v.
Odom, 2007 WL 1812615, at *6 (M.D.Ga. June 19, 2007);
Osiris v. Brown, 2005 WL 2044904, at *2 (D.N.J.
Aug.24, 2005); see also We the People Beys and Els v.
State of New York, 165 F.3d 16, 1998 WL 801875, at *1
(2nd Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion). Plaintiff cannot
unilaterally bestow sovereign immunity upon himself. See
United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2nd Cir.
plaintiff's claim that the government cannot require
citizens to register their vehicles is without merit.
Requiring vehicles to be registered is an exercise of the
police power of the state. See Ingels v. Boteler,
100 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1938).
the reasons explained above, the FAC is legally frivolous and
plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Although plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the
court liberally construes his pleading, the undersigned
concludes that allowing plaintiff to file an additional
amended complaint would be futile.
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
action be dismissed ...