United States District Court, S.D. California
DAVID BRYAN TURNER, Jr., Booking No. 197347785, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; SAN DIEGO HARBOR POLICE, Police Officer John Doe; SAN DIEGO SHERIFF DEPT., John Doe; METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEMS, Trolley Police Officer Jane Doe; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CITY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM D. GORE; CAPTAIN BUCHANAN, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)(1)
Hon.
Gonzalo P. Curiel, United States District Judge
I.
Procedural History
On
October 11, 2019, David Bryan Turner, Jr.,
(“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at the George Bailey
Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego,
California, filed a civil rights action
(“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a) (ECF No. 2). The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion
to Proceed IFP[1] but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint
for failing to state a claim and as frivolous for raising
claims duplicative of an action he had already filed. (ECF
No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended
complaint to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified
in the Court's Order. (Id. at 10-11.)
Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on
November 14, 2019. (ECF No. 4). However, the claims raised in
the FAC are vague and do not appear to relate to the claims
that he raised in his original Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff
no longer names San Diego Harbor Police, San Diego Sheriff
Department, or the Metropolitan Transit System as Defendants.
He does, however, add the State of California, City of San
Diego, William D. Gore, and Captain Buchanan as Defendants.
II.
Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A
A.
Standard of Review
As the
Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner
and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and §
1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it,
which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or
seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of
[screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous
or malicious suits need not bear the expense of
responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d
903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
“The
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct”
or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
B.
Rule 8
“Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim,
” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation
must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(d)(1). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. In addition
to the grounds for sua sponte dismissal set out in §
1915(e)(2)(B), the district court may also dismiss a
complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 if it fails to
provide the defendant fair notice of the wrongs allegedly
committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of
complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with
redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso,
United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases
upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were
“verbose, ” “confusing, ”
“distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible, ”
“highly repetitious, ” and comprised of
“incomprehensible rambling, ” while noting that
“[o]ur district courts are busy enough without having
to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and
Peace to discern a plaintiff's claims and
allegations.”).
Here,
Plaintiff's FAC contains virtually no specific factual
allegations. Moreover, his FAC is disjointed and difficult to
discern what claims he is attempting to make. While
“legal conclusions” like “cruel and unusual
punishment” “can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations,
” lest the Plaintiff face dismissal. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
The
Court finds Plaintiff's FAC violates Rule 8 of the FRCP
by failing to provide Defendants fair notice of the wrongs
allegedly committed. Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES the entire Complaint on Rule 8
grounds.
C.
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