California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
In re L.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
L.W., Defendant and Appellant.
Superior Court County of Los Angeles No. PJ52813, Fred J.
Fujioka, Judge, Morton Rochman, Judge
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Stephanie C. Santoro,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
was charged in a juvenile wardship petition with committing
sexual battery against two minor females. (Welf. & Inst.
Code,  § 602; Pen. Code, § 243.4,
subd. (e)(1).) Prior to adjudication, and without any prior
notice to L.W. or his counsel, the juvenile court issued
temporary restraining orders against appellant as to the two
alleged victims pursuant to section 213.5 and rule 5.630 of
the California Rules of Court (rule 5.630). Following a
noticed hearing held prior to adjudication, the court issued
a three-year restraining order as to both alleged victims.
appeals from both the temporary restraining orders and the
three-year restraining order. He contends the temporary
restraining orders were erroneously granted without notice,
and that the three-year restraining order was not supported
by substantial evidence. We agree with the first contention
but reject the second. We affirm.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
February 2018, appellant (who was then 14 years old) was
charged in a section 602 petition with assault with a deadly
weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), false
imprisonment by violence (id., § 236), and
resisting a peace officer (id., § 148, subd.
(a)(1)). He was ordered detained. Pursuant to a negotiated
disposition, appellant admitted the assault and the court
sustained the petition as to that count, dismissed the other
counts, and ordered appellant placed home on probation with
various terms and conditions.
October 5, 2018, appellant was charged in a subsequent
wardship petition with committing sexual battery against
14-year-old minors S.G. (count 1) and C.M. (count 2). At the
November 13, 2018 arraignment hearing, the prosecutor
requested that the court issue temporary restraining orders
against appellant as to S.G. and C.M. Defense counsel
objected on the ground that the prosecution had not satisfied
the requirements for the issuance of temporary restraining
orders without notice, as set forth in Code of Civil
Procedure section 527, subdivision (c). The prosecutor
countered that applications for temporary restraining orders
in juvenile cases are governed by rule 5.630(d), which makes
no mention of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.
court concluded that “the rule of court applies”
and granted the temporary restraining orders, which were
prepared on form JV-250 as provided in rule 5.630(d). After
the court made its ruling, the prosecutor sought to
“make a record” by orally adding
“[i]t's alleged... that at a high school football
game [appellant] grabbed one victim and began touching her
breast and vagina against her consent and then went on to
touching another victim in a similar way trying to unbutton
her pants. These are the facts under which the People are
submitting this temporary restraining order request.”
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's offer of
proof on the ground “[i]t does not comply with what is
required by law.” The court overruled the objection. In
accordance with section 213.5, a noticed hearing on the
restraining orders was set for December 4, 2018.
December 4 hearing, the prosecutor presented the testimony of
Los Angeles Unified School District Police Officer Leo
Gil. On September 12, 2018, Officer Gil
interviewed S.G. and C.M. S.G. told the officer she was at a
high school football game on the night of September 7 when
appellant pulled her by the arm, hugged and touched her, and
rubbed her vagina over her clothing. Appellant also asked
S.G. if she was “horny.” She pulled away from him
and left with her friend. C.M. told Officer Gil that
appellant approached her at the football game that same
evening, said “I want you, ” and touched her
breast and vagina over her clothing. Appellant also tried to
unbuckle C.M.'s pants, but she told him to stop and
pulled away from him.
conclusion of the hearing, the prosecutor argued: “I
believe the court has before it evidence showing good cause
to issue this restraining order. There were two victims here
who were assaulted... within an hour of each other, both
taken to an area that the minor had exclusive access to them.
Both were contacted by the minor physically. He touched their
breasts, their vaginas. In the case of the second victim,
[C.M.], he attempted to unbutton her pants.... [¶]
Additionally, this court is able to look at the record of
[appellant] in determining whether good cause has been shown
to issue a restraining order. [Appellant] is on probation for
[an assault] against his mother. He's also on probation
[for another assault] in Maryland. So the People believe
there's good cause for this court to issue a restraining
countered among other things that the order could not be
issued because “[t]here has been no good cause to
establish that my client, after the alleged incidents,
intimidated, dissuaded any victims, alleged victims.
There's no evidence presented that an emergency existed
at the time the People are seeking this restraining order.
This incident happened on allegedly September 7, 2018. The
officer didn't interview them until September 12, 2018,
and my client has not been at that school... for at least a
few months. So in light of that, I don't believe that
there's the requisite justification for the court to sign
off on this restraining order.”
court found good cause for the restraining order and signed
and issued an order providing that appellant shall not
“contact, threaten, stalk, or disturb the peace
of” S.G. and C.M. for a period of three years. The
order also states that appellant “must stay 100 yards
away” from S.G. and C.M. and ...