United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REMAND 
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff Laura Munoz's
(“Munoz”) Motion for Leave to File a First
Amended Complaint and Remand to State Court. (Mot. to Amend
Compl. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 9.) Munoz seeks to amend
her Complaint to add a new party, Lorraine Herrera
(“Herrera”), and remand the matter back to state
court. (Mot. 2.) However, because Munoz does not satisfy the
IBC Aviation test, the Court DENIES Munoz's
Motion. (ECF No. 9.)
about June 18, 2017, Munoz slipped-and-fell while shopping at
Wal-Mart. (Mot. 2.) On February 25, 2019, Munoz brought this
action against Wal-Mart in state court, and alleged
negligence and premises liability. (Mot. 2.) On grounds of
diversity jurisdiction, Wal-Mart removed this matter from
state court on September 26, 2019. (Mot. 2.) Munoz asserts
that Herrera was the manager of the store at the time of her
slip and fall. (Mot. 2.) Munoz also asserts that ultimately
Herrera was responsible for (1) the maintenance of the store
at the time of her slip and fall; (2) verifying that there
was in place a policy that provided for the maintenance of
the store; (3) the training and education of the store
employees who were tasked with conducting the maintenance of
the store; and (4) verifying that the store be maintained
according to industry standards. (Mot. 2.) Almost eight
months after bringing this action and after Wal-Mart removed
this action, does Munoz only now moves to amend her Complaint
and add Herrera as a defendant. (Mot. 2.)
plaintiff tries to join more defendants after removal, and
that joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, a
court may deny joinder, or allow it and remand the case. 28
U.S.C. § 1447(e). Under the statute, the decision is up
to “the sound discretion of the court, ” and is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir.
often consider six factors in deciding whether to allow
plaintiff to amend to add a non-diverse defendant: (1)
whether party to be joined is needed for just adjudication
and would have to be joined under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations would
preclude an original action against the new defendants in
state court; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in
requesting joinder; (4) whether joinder is intended solely to
defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claims against
the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether denial of
joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. IBC Aviation
Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de
C.V., 125 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(collecting cases identifying the factors). A court need not
consider all the issues, as any factor can be decisive, and
no one of them is a necessary condition for joinder.
Negrete v. Meadowbrook Meat Co., ED CV 11-1861 DOC,
2012 WL 254039 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012); Yang v.
Swissport USA, Inc., C 09-03823 SI, 2010 WL 2680800
(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010). Granting leave to amend is only
appropriate if the factors for joinder outweigh those against
joinder. IBC Aviation, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
Court now determines whether the IBC Aviation test favors
joinder and granting Munoz leave to amend her Complaint.
Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of a person (a)
whose absence would preclude complete relief among existing
parties, or (b) who claims an interest in the action and, if
the case is disposed without that person, the result either
may impair or impede the absent person's ability to
protect their interest, or it may leave an existing party
subject to inconsistent obligations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a).
“The standard is met when failure to join will lead to
separate and redundant actions, ” but it is not met
when “defendants are only tangentially related to the
cause of action or would not prevent complete relief.”
IBC Aviation, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1012.
no such circumstances exist. Munoz alleges that Herrera was
the manager of the Wal-Mart and ultimately responsible for
Munoz's injuries. (Mot. 5.) However, Munoz provides no
argument as to why Herrera's absence would preclude
complete relief, or impair or impede Munoz's ability to
protect her interest. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). All Munoz has
claimed is that Herrera was the manager in charge on the day
that she fell. Colonna v. Lowe's Hiw Inc., No.
SA-CV-130556-DOC (RNBx), 2013 WL 12130012, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
June 21, 2013) (finding similar allegations do not support
allowing plaintiff to amend.) However, Munoz seeks money
damages, accordingly, Wal-Mart may be held liable for damages
caused by their employees, even if Herrera is not joined in
this action. See King v. Soexo, Inc., No.
2:16-CV-03076-ODW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4161095, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 2016) (individual employees of an employer defendant
are not necessary under Rule 19(a) because liability for the
Individual Defendants' actions as an employee are imputed
to his employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior);
Fonseca v. Wal Mart Assocs., Inc., No.
ED-CV-19821-JGB (KKx), 2019 WL 2903960, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July
5, 2019). Thus, Munoz is able to obtain complete relief in
Herrera's absence. King v. Soexo, Inc., 2016 WL
4161095, at *3. Thus, Walmart is “correct that under
Rule 19(a), Herrera is a not necessary party.”
Id. Accordingly, this factor does not support
allowing Munoz to amend.