United States District Court, E.D. California
ANTOINE L. ARDDS, Plaintiff,
D. HICKS, et.al., Defendants.
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A
DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BE DENIED [ECF No. 11]
Antoine L. Ardds is appearing pro se and in
forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
before the Court is Plaintiff's “motion in support
of 42 USC 2000(d), ” filed January 3, 2020. Plaintiff
seeks a court order directing prison officials to refrain
from denying access and/or destroying his legal property. The
Court construes Plaintiff's motion as a request for a
purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance of
equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice
requires the court to intervene to secure the positions until
the merits of the action are ultimately determined.
University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction [or temporary restraining order] must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). A party seeking a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that
motion is unsupported by evidence.
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering
a request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is
bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it
have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley
Forge Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the Court
does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has
no power to hear the matter in question. Id.
Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief
[sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right.” A federal court may issue emergency
injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one
“becomes a party officially, and is required to take
action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or
other authority-asserting measure stating the time within
which the party served must appear to defend.”). The
Court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not
before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v.
INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983).
initial matter, Plaintiff's case is in the preliminary
screening stage, and the United States Marshal has yet to
effect service on any Defendant, and Defendants have no
actual notice. Therefore, the Court has no personal
jurisdiction over any Defendant at this time. Fed.R.Civ.P.
65(d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); Zepeda v. U.S.
I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983).
even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over the
individuals named in the complaint, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate imminent irreparable harm necessary to support a
preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20;
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “The fact that plaintiff
has met the pleading requirements allowing him to proceed
with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to a
preliminary injunction.” Claiborne v. Blauser,
No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
31, 2011), report and recommended adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427
LKK, 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). Instead, to
meet the “irreparable harm” requirement,
Plaintiff must do more than simply allege imminent harm; he
must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v.
Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Mere
“[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable
injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary
injunction.” Id. at 674-75.
seeks a court order preventing prison officials from
depriving him of access to his legal property and to prevent
them from destroying his property. Inmates have a fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Silva v. Di
Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011);
Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009).
However, to state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must
show that he suffered an actual injury, which requires
“actual prejudice to contemplated or existing
litigation.” Nevada Dep't of Corr. v.
Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips,
588 F.3d at 655. To prevail on a claim regarding denial of
access to the courts, it is not enough for an inmate to show
some sort of denial Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
actual injury. Plaintiff has not shown that without an
injunction he will miss a deadline or have this action
dismissed. In addition, Plaintiff's complaints about
access and destruction of his legal property are not related
to his underlying claims in this action. Thus, an injunction
is not proper. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v.
Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding there must be a “sufficient nexus
between the request in a motion for injunctive relief and the
underlying claim itself”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that in the absence of preliminary injunctive
relief he is likely to suffer actual injury in prosecuting
his case. “Speculative injury does not constitute
irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a
preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs.
Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988),
citing Goldies Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court,
739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984).
is further advised that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without
due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in
his personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728,
730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional deprivations of
property are actionable under the Due Process Clause, see
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984);
Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985),
but the Due Process Clause is violated only when the agency
“prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property
without underlying statutory authority and competent
procedural protections, ” Nevada Dept. of
Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.
2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090
(9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted). The Due
Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized
deprivation of property so long as the state provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31
F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff alleges an
unauthorized taking of his property which is not actionable
under the Due Process Clause because California provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v.
Centoni, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov't Code
§§810-895). In this instance, Plaintiff has alleged
an unauthorized deprivation of his property which is not
cognizable by way of section 1983, as he has an adequate
remedy under California law.
the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly
assign a ...