United States District Court, N.D. California
M. M., Plaintiff,
v.
County of San Mateo, et. al., Defendants.
ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT OPINIONS AND
TESTIMONY OF ROGER CLARK UNDER FED. R. EVID. 702 RE: DKT.
NOS. 51, 53, 59
YVONNE
GONZALEZ ROGERS United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
M.M., a minor, by and through her Guardian ad litem,
brings this action against defendants County of San Mateo
(the “County”), deputies Robert Willett, Devin
Crocker, James Brown, and Does 1 to 50, inclusive. Plaintiff
alleges four causes of action: (1) deprivation of
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
including unreasonable search and seizure, arrest without
probable cause, and excessive and unreasonable force and
restraint in the course of an arrest against deputies Willet,
Crocker, and Brown, as well as Does 1-25; (2) deprivation of
those same constitutional rights in violation of Section
1983, pursuant to Monell, against the County and
Does 26-50; (3) violation of California Civil Code §
52.1, the Bane Act, against all defendants; and (4) battery
against all defendants.
Now
before the Court are the following motions: First, defendants
move for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims. Second,
plaintiff cross-moves for partial summary judgment on the
issue of excessive force. Third, defendants move to exclude
expert opinions and testimony of Roger Clark under
Fed.R.Evid. 702.
Having
carefully reviewed the pleadings, the papers submitted on
each motion, the parties' oral arguments at the hearing
held on December 10, 2019, and for the reasons set forth more
fully below, the Court: (1) Grants
defendants' motion for summary judgment; (2)
Denies plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment; and (3) Denies as Moot
defendants' motion to exclude expert opinions and
testimony of Roger Clark under Fed.R.Evid. 702.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
initial facts of this incident are not materially in
dispute: On August 13, 2017, plaintiff was residing at
Your House South (“YHS”), a group home in Redwood
City. (See Dkt. No. 61, Undisputed Fact
(“UF”) 1.) Plaintiff was 15 years old, and was
approximately five feet six or seven inches tall, and 120
pounds at the time of the incident. (UF 61-62.) YHS is a
facility that helps at risk youth. (UF 2.) At the time,
Alexis Austin was a relief counselor and facility manager at
YHS. (UF 3.) Prior to August 13, 2017, plaintiff had been
placed on a psychiatric hold under California Welfare &
Institutions Code § 5150. (UF 4.)
On the
night of August 13, 2017, after being unable to locate
plaintiff, Austin reported plaintiff missing by calling 911.
(UF 5.) Austin advised the 911 operator that she was
“very concerned” because plaintiff was “not
in a good place” and had a “history of self
harm.” (UF 6.) According to Austin, plaintiff had
appeared to be crying and was not herself earlier that day.
(UF 9.) Austin subsequently located plaintiff who had been
hiding in a closet. (UF 7.) At approximately 10:51 p.m. that
same day, Austin called 911 to cancel the missing
person's report. (UF 8.)
Later
that evening on August 13, 2017, plaintiff provided a journal
entry that caused Austin concerned. (UF 10.) Plaintiff's
journal entry stated, in part, that “I'm in a dark
place where I can't seem to find a way out and it's
slowly killing every inch of me. Just want to get out of it
because soon it will be too late.” (UF 11; see
also Dkt. 51-12 at 6.) Plaintiff was concealing her arm
and would not allow Austin to see her arms. (UF 12.) Austin
became concerned that plaintiff may have cut herself. (UF
13.) Based on plaintiff's affect, her journal entry, and
because she was holding her arms, Austin became concerned for
plaintiff's welfare and safety. (UF 14.)
At
approximately 12:08 a.m. on August 14, 2017, Austin called
911 to request that plaintiff be assessed for a hold under
Section 5150. (UF 15.) Defendant Deputy Robert Willett
responded to the dispatch call for a potential Section 5150
situation and came to YHS to assess plaintiff for a hold. (UF
18.) Upon arrival at YHS, Dep. Willett checked to see if the
San Mateo County Mental Health Assessment and Referral Team
(“SMART”) was available to conduct the Section
5150 assessment, but it was not. (UF 19.) Dep. Willett was
relayed information from the 911 call made by Austin. (Dkt.
No. 51-5 at 3-4.) Austin further provided Dep. Willett with
plaintiff's journal entry. (UF 20.)
Dep.
Willett entered the bedroom where plaintiff was located,
introduced himself, and tried to have a conversation with
her. (UF 21.) The discussion between Dep. Willett and
plaintiff is disputed by the parties.[1] At some point during this
discussion, Dep. Willett asked plaintiff to show her arm to
him, but plaintiff refused repeated requests to do so. (UF
24.)
After
several failed attempts to secure plaintiff's
cooperation, and in view of the troubling journal entry that
had led YHS to call for a Section 5150 assessment,
plaintiff's earlier actions of hiding in a closet,
refusing to show her wrists suggesting that she had harmed
herself and her history of self harm, Dep. Willett determined
that plaintiff should be taken to a hospital for a Section
5150 hold. (UF 25.) Dep. Willett called for an ambulance to
assist with the assessment and medical evaluation of
plaintiff, and to transport plaintiff to a hospital for
evaluation. (UF 26.) Dep. Willett also called for backup
deputies to assist. (UF 27.)
While
Dep. Willett attempted to engage with plaintiff, she remained
seated on a bed in her room. (UF 28.) Plaintiff continued to
refuse repeated requests to show her arm. (UF 29.) At some
point thereafter, paramedics and two other officers, Deputies
Devin Crocker and James Brown, arrived to YHS. Plaintiff
refused to show her wrists to the paramedics although
plaintiff allowed her blood pressure to be taken through a
device placed on her finger. (UF 30; see also Dkt.
54-8 at 4.) At some point thereafter, the paramedics left
plaintiff's room.
Plaintiff,
Austin, and Deps. Willett, Crocker, and Brown remained in
plaintiff's room after the paramedics stepped
out.[2]
After approximately fifteen minutes of discussion between
Willett and plaintiff in her room in an effort to get
plaintiff to show her arms, Dep. Willett warned plaintiff
that he and other deputies would be grabbing her wrist
because of her non-compliance with officers' instructions
and Dep. Willett's determination that plaintiff would be
subject to a Section 5150 hold.[3] (UF 31; see also Dkt.
No. 51-5 at 7, 16, 17, 18-19.) Dep. Willett told plaintiff he
would count to three and that a deputy would grab each of her
wrists to place her on the floor to apply handcuffs. (UF 34.)
Deps. Willett and Crocker each grabbed one of plaintiff's
wrist using a rear wrist control hold. (Dkt. No. 51-5 at 17;
Dkt. No. 54-3 at 8-9; Dkt. No. 54-4 at 5-6.)
The
parties each have different views of the next events:
Plaintiff's
Version: Deps. Willett and Crocker applied a pain
compliance maneuver, in other words, pressure to her wrists,
prior to any resistance from plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at
30-33, 34-35; Dkt. No. 54-3 at 6-7, 8-9; Dkt. No. 54-4 at
5-7, 8.) Based on the rear wrist control hold, plaintiff
involuntarily arose from the bed where she had been seated.
(Dkt. No. 54-4 at 8; Dkt. No. 63-1 at 7.) While standing,
plaintiff was not stiffening, pushing back, or doing anything
purposeful with her body. (Dkt. No. 54-5 at 7.) Plaintiff was
subsequently slammed to the floor by Deps. Willett and
Crocker while Dep. Willett had his arm around plaintiff's
throat. (Dkt. No. 54-1 at 11, 13, 14-15, 16.) One of these
two deputies had their knee pressed into plaintiff's back
while on the floor. (Dkt. No. 54-5 at 3) Willett told
plaintiff at this time, “I'm not your friend,
I'm not your therapist.” (Dkt. No. 54-1 at 11.)
Plaintiff resisted because she could not breathe based on the
pressure being applied to her back. (Dkt. No. 54-5 at 8-9,
12-13.) Dep. Brown's handcuffing of plaintiff resulted in
abrasions to her wrists. (Dkt. No. 54-5 at 15-16.)
Defendants'
Version: Plaintiff shouted “fuck you” to
Dep. Willett. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 8.) Plaintiff arose from the
bed where she had been seated. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 8.)
Plaintiff planted her feet and stiffened her body and stated
that she would not get on the floor. (Dkt. No. 51-3 at 20;
Dkt. No. 54-2 at 7-8.) Plaintiff tensed her body and went
rigid. (Dkt. No. 51-3 at 20; Dkt. No. 54-2 at 8, 32, 38-39;
Dkt. No. 54-3 at 9.) At this point, Deps. Willett and Crocker
applied a pain compliance maneuver by applying pressure to
plaintiff's wrists and back. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 8, 32-33.)
Plaintiff resisted while on the floor. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 34;
Dkt. No. 54-5 at 8-9, 12-13.)
The
following facts during and about the interaction are not
materially in dispute: Deps. Willett and Crocker each
applied pressure to plaintiff's wrists. (UF 38.) Deps.
Willett and Crocker each had a hand on plaintiff's back,
with one deputy placing his hand on her lower back, and the
other on her upper back and shoulder. (Dkt. No. 54-2 at 22,
28; Dkt. No. 54-5 at 4-5.) While Deps. Willett and Crocker
each grabbed one of plaintiff's wrists, plaintiff fell to
her knees, then on to her breasts, and then her face made
contact with the floor. (Dkt. No. 51-4 at 14-15; Dkt. No.
54-2 at 22, 39.) Plaintiff did not suffer any pain or
injuries to her breasts or face. (Dkt. No. 51-4 at 14-15.)
Dep. Brown did not attempt to stop Deps. Willett or Crocker
from using a pain compliance technique on plaintiff to get
plaintiff to the floor. (UF 76.) Because of the incident,
Dep. Willett sprained his thumb. (UF 81.)
Plaintiff
did not feel any pain from the rear wrist holds applied by
Deps. Willett and Crocker until she was on the floor. (Dkt.
No. 60-1 at 5-6.) At no point during this incident did
plaintiff attempt to flee. (UF 67.) While the deputies
informed plaintiff that they would grab her wrist, they did
not warn her specifically that they would inflict pain on her
if she continued to refuse to comply with their request to
see her wrist. (UF 75.)
The
parties agree that a rear-wrist lock control hold does not
become a pain compliance technique until pressure is applied
in order to inflict pain on the individual that it is being
applied on. (UF 77.)
The
facts following the interaction are not materially in
dispute: Once plaintiff was on the floor, handcuffs were
applied almost immediately thereafter by Dep. Brown and
plaintiff was escorted by Deps. Willett, Crocker, and Brown
out of YHS to a gurney. (UF 40.) Once on the gurney,
plaintiff was placed in soft restraints. (UF 41.)
The
records of the paramedics who took plaintiff from YHS to the
hospital do not document any immediate injuries from the
incident, report that “she states that she does not
have a complaint at this time, ” and report plaintiff
as being “calm.” (UF 43, 44; see also
Dkt.No. 13 at 4-5.) Plaintiff did not report any pain in her
neck or throat to the doctors at the medical center, the
Psychiatric Emergency Services provider, who saw her
immediately after the incident. (UF 46.)
Once
plaintiff returned from the Section 5150 hold, Austin took
photographs of bruises to plaintiff's wrists. (Dkt. No.
54-1 at 18; see also Dkt. No. 54-5 at 21.) On August
18, 2017, plaintiff reported pain in her neck or throat to
doctors at San Mateo Medical Center.[4] (Dkt. No. 54-10 at 2.)
The
facts regarding the policies of San Mateo County are not
materially in dispute: On the continuum of force
described in the San Mateo County Sheriff's Office
(“SMCSO”) Use of Force policy, control holds and
pain compliance techniques are just above light touch and
below higher degrees of force, such as restraint devices and
pepper spray. (UF 42; see also Dkt. No. 51-14 at 2.)
The policy provides that deputies may use reasonable force to
effect an arrest, ” and that pain compliance techniques
“may be effective in controlling a physically or
actively resisting individual.” (Id. at 5.) In
a different section, the policy manual further advises
deputies that deputies “should consider that taking no
action or passively monitoring the situation may be the most
reasonable response to the mental health crisis.” (Dkt.
No. 54-6 at 40.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support that assertion by . . .
citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits, or declarations, stipulations . . .
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,
” or by “showing that materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Thus,
summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A
moving party defendant bears the burden of specifying the
basis for the motion and the elements of the causes of action
upon which the plaintiff will be unable to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish the
existence of a material fact that may affect the outcome of
the case under the governing substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In the
summary judgment context, the court construes all disputed
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.
2004). If the plaintiff “produces direct evidence of a
material fact, the court may not assess the credibility of
this evidence nor weigh against it any conflicting evidence
presented by” defendants. Mayes v. WinCo Holdings,
Inc., 846 F.3d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017).
“[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge.” George
v. Edholm, 752 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Thus
“where evidence is genuinely disputed on a particular
issue- such as by conflicting testimony-that issue is
inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.”
Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]hen
parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, each
motion must be considered on its own merits.” Fair
Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two,
249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he court must rule
on each party's motion on an individual and separate
basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be
entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.”
Id. (quoting Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure ยง 2720, at 335-36 (3d ed. 1998)). If, however,
the cross-motions are before ...