United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT
SERVICES' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
[82]
OTIS
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Rushmore Loan
Management Services' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). (ECF No.
82.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS
Defendant's Motion.[1]
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
Court previously set forth the pertinent facts in its October
8, 2019 Order (“October Order”), (ECF No. 85),
granting motions to dismiss filed by Defendants JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), Federal National
Mortgage Association's (“Fannie Mae”), and
NDeX West LCC (“NDeX”); thus, the Court shall
only repeat the facts relevant to Defendant Rushmore Loan
Management Services' (“Rushmore” or
“Defendant”) Motion here.
On July
20, 2007, Plaintiff Felipe Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”)
purchased the real property located at 14229 Tiara Street,
Los Angeles, California 91410 (“Property”) and
signed a deed of trust in the amount of $387, 750.00 with
Chase (“Loan”). (First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 60.) In September
2010, Chase sold the Property to Fannie Mae in a foreclosure
sale. (FAC ¶ 24.) In the summer of 2015, Chase
transferred its loan servicing duties of Gonzalez's home
mortgage loan to Rushmore. (FAC ¶ 31.) Gonzalez alleges
“Rushmore [then placed] a lock box on [his] home”
and informed him that the lockbox would remain since
“[Rushmore] had rights to the home” (“2015
lockbox incident”). (FAC ¶ 32.) Gonzalez further
alleges that it was unclear who was overseeing the Loan at
the time because although Rushmore began to service the Loan
in 2015, Gonzalez also “continued to be solicited for
[loan] modifications from Chase.” (FAC ¶¶
30-31.)
In
February 2016, Fannie Mae assigned the deed of trust to a
third party. (See Defs.' Req. for Judicial
Notice (“RJN”), Ex. D Assignment of Deed of Trust
(“2016 Assignment”), ECF No. 65-4; FAC ¶
31.) Thereafter, in May 2016, Gonzalez alleges that
“two women appeared at the [P]roperty, claim[ing] to
represent the bank, ” and demanded entry, which
Gonzalez denied (“2016 bank representative
incident”). (FAC ¶ 33.) Gonzalez alleges the two
individuals trespassed anyway and told Gonzalez “he
could not make changes to the [P]roperty.”
(Id.)
On
September 20, 2018, Gonzalez filed his First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Chase,
Fannie Mae, NDeX, and Rushmore. (See generally FAC.)
Gonzalez alleges that each of his thirteen cause of actions
are tied to Defendants' mismanagement of his Loan and
violations of his rights in the Property. (FAC ¶¶
10-13, 37-132.) On October 8, 2019, the Court granted motions
to dismiss filed by Chase, Fannie Mae, and NDeX on res
judicata grounds and because Gonzalez failed to plead
sufficient facts to show Chase, Fannie Mae, or NDeX held a
continued interest in the Loan or the Property after 2015 and
2016. The Court now considers Defendant Rushmore's motion
to dismiss.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court
may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a
cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to
support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need
only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2)-a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter
v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual
“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The
determination of whether a complaint satisfies the
plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A
court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe
all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . .
. as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the
plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,
679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept
conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and
unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
Where a
district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should
generally provide leave to amend unless it is clear the
complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines
that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if
amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and
Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir.
2011).
IV.
DISCUSSION
As the
Court discussed in its October Order, while Gonzalez's
claims arising from alleged incidents dating between 2007 and
2010 involving the Loan and the Property are barred by res
judicata, Gonzalez's claims arising from the 2015 lockbox
incident and the 2016 bank representative incident are not
similarly barred. Still, as the Court previously determined,
Gonzalez fails to sufficiently allege that Rushmore acted as
an agent of Chase and Fannie Mae. See Swartz v. KPMG
LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal where complaint merely asserted that one defendant
was agent of another defendant without any stated factual
basis).
Therefore,
in order to maintain an action against Rushmore, Gonzalez
must allege sufficient facts to hold Rushmore directly liable
for his alleged injuries. Rushmore moves to dismiss
Gonzalez's nine claims against it, primarily arguing
Gonzalez's allegations lack facial plausibility because
they depend on unsupported facts and unfounded legal
conclusions. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees
that Gonzalez's FAC fails to allege a cognizable legal
theory based on the 2015 and 2016 incidents. Accordingly, the
Court dismisses all claims against Rushmore.
A.
Quiet Title and Slander of Title (Sixth Cause of
Action)
Gonzalez's
sixth cause of action seeks quiet title, alleging that no
Defendant holds any proper interest in the Property. (FAC
¶¶ 93-97.)
A
complaint to quiet title must be verified and include: (1) a
description of the property; (2) the title of the plaintiff
and the basis of the title; (3) the adverse claims to the
title; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought;
and (5) a prayer for the determination of the title of the
plaintiff. California Code of Civil Procedure (“Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code”) § 761.020. A verified complaint
is a signed complaint with the plaintiff's oath or
affidavit stating that, to the best of his or her knowledge,
all information in the complaint is true and correct.
Waldrop v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. ED
16-cv-413-DMG (SPx), 2016 WL 7626145, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 2016). In California, “a mortgagor cannot quiet his
title against the mortgagee without paying the debt
secured.” Briosos v. Wells Fargo Bank, 737
F.Supp.2d 1018, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). “Thus, to maintain a quiet
title claim, a plaintiff is required to allege ...