United States District Court, C.D. California
DAVID W. P.,[1] Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL,[2] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KAREN
L. STEVENSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
INTRODUCTION
David
W. P. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint on
September 20, 2018, seeking review of the denial of his
application for Supplemental Security Insurance
(“SSI”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 19, 2018, the
parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to
proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge. (Dkt. Nos. 11-13.) On June 28, 2019, the parties filed
a Joint Stipulation (“Joint Stip.”). (Dkt. No.
24.) Plaintiff seeks an order reversing and remanding the
ALJ's decision. (Joint Stip. at 21.) The Commissioner
requests that the ALJ's decision be affirmed.
(Id. at 20-21.) The Court has taken the matter under
submission without oral argument.
SUMMARY
OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On
March 30, 2015, Plaintiff, who was born on February 1, 1969,
filed an application SSI.[3] (See Administrative Record
(“AR”) 26, 180-88; Joint Stip. at 2.) Plaintiff
alleged disability commencing August 1, 2009. (AR 18, 180.)
He previously worked as a drill helper (DOT[4] 930.684-026),
construction worker I (DOT 869.664-014), and boilermaker
helper II (DOT 805.664-010). (AR 26.) After the Commissioner
initially denied Plaintiff's application (AR 106-15), he
requested a hearing (AR 117). Administrative Law Judge Evelyn
M. Gunn (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on July 12,
2017. (AR 51.) Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified.
(AR 51-70.) On October 5, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision. (AR 18-28.) The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 1-6.)
SUMMARY
OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity from the March 30, 2015 application date through the
date of the ALJ's decision. (AR 20.) She determined that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: affective
mood disorder, schizophrenia, and substance abuse.
(Id.) After specifically considering listings 12.03
and 12.04, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926). (AR 21.) The ALJ
determined that from the application date through the date of
the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels with the following non-exertional
limitations: “he can understand, remember and carry out
simple instructions. He can maintain concentration,
persistence and pace for two-hour periods. He would work
better with things than people. He should have no public
contact.” (AR 22.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was
unable to perform his past relevant work. (AR 26.) She then
found that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform, including the representative occupations of
cleaner II (DOT 919.687-014), industrial sweeper (DOT
389.683-010), and scrap sorter (DOT 509.686-018). (AR 27.)
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been
under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from the SSI application date through the date of the
ALJ's decision. (AR 28.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
This
Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine
whether it is free from legal error and supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th
Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a
mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'” Gutierrez
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Even when the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the
Court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are
supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110
(9th Cir. 2012).
Although
this Court cannot substitute its discretion for the
Commissioner's, the Court nonetheless must review the
record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that
supports and the evidence that detracts from the
Commissioner's conclusion.” Reddick v.
Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1988). “The
ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving
ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court will uphold the
Commissioner's decision when the evidence is susceptible
to more than one rational interpretation. Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). However,
the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in
her decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground
upon which he did not rely.” Orn, 495 F.3d at
630. The Court will not reverse the Commissioner's
decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists if
the error is “‘inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination,' or if despite the legal
error, ‘the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned.'” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806
F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
There
are two issues in dispute: (1) whether substantial evidence
supported the ALJ's RFC determination, and (2) whether
the ALJ abused her discretion in failing to propound
interrogatories requested by Plaintiff. (Joint Stip. at 4.)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC
determination. Further, although the ALJ erred in denying
Plaintiff's request for interrogatories on procedural
grounds, the error was harmless and, therefore, not an abuse
of the ALJ's discretion.
I.
The ALJ's RFC Assessment
A.
Legal Standard
A
claimant's RFC represents the most a claimant can do
despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945
(a)(1); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 724; Smolen v.
Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996). The
ALJ's RFC determination “must set out all
the limitations and restrictions of the particular
claimant.” Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in
original). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility
and resolving conflicts in medical testimony.
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. An ALJ can satisfy the
specific and legitimate reasons standard by “setting
out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and
conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretations
thereof, and making findings.” Orn, 495 F.3d
at 632; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) (stating
that Commissioner will assess RFC “based on all of the
relevant medical and other evidence”).
B.
Evidence of Plaintiff's Treatment
The
record shows that in January 2012, Plaintiff was evaluated by
Laja Ibraheem, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist. (AR
264-67.) Plaintiff reported experiencing depression,
paranoia, memory loss, anxiety, and functional limitations.
(AR 266-67.) Dr. Ibraheem observed that Plaintiff was able to
dress and bathe himself, he was not disheveled, he had good
hygiene, and he took no medications. (AR 264-65.) He was
cooperative, and his thought processes were tight and
goal-directed, with no flight of thought, looseness of
association, thought-blocking, or distractibility. (AR 266)
He had normal reality contact; there was no evidence of
auditory or visual hallucinations, responses to internal
stimuli, or paranoia. (Id.) Dr. Ibraheem reported
that Plaintiff described his mood as “depressed”
and his affect was appropriate to his mood. (Id.) He
diagnosed Plaintiff with psychotic disorder, not otherwise
specified (“NOS”) and alcohol dependence.
(Id.) He assessed that Plaintiff would be able to
focus attention adequately; have no difficulty following one-
or two-part instructions or remembering and completing tasks;
have no difficulty being able to tolerate stress inherent in
work, maintain regular attendance, and/or work without
supervision; and be able to interact with supervisors,
co-workers, and the general public. (AR 267.)
In June
2013, Plaintiff's mental status examination showed that
his symptoms were “mild, ” despite reporting
having experienced auditory hallucinations. (AR 300.)
Plaintiff was cooperative, his thought processes were linear
and logical, and he had normal cognition, insight, and
judgment. (Id.) Plaintiff was incarcerated between
July 2013 and December 2014, during which time he had access
to mental health services. (See generally AR
320-70.) Plaintiff's progress notes from that time reveal
that he displayed psychotic features, including
hallucinations, but his cognitive abilities were unimpaired
and was not confused. (AR 320-26, 364-65, 370.)
Plaintiff's mental status examinations revealed good
cognitive functioning and no psychotic behavior. (AR 298,
300, 309, 345, 349, 355-56, 360-62, 368.) While he claimed to
experience auditory hallucinations, he also claimed he was
able to ignore them and stated that his medications, Zyprexa
and Zoloft, were helpful. (AR 333, 341-42, 348.)
Between
January and October 2015, [5] Plaintiff's progress notes showed
that he reported a depressed affect, experienced
hopelessness, helplessness, sleep disturbances, mood swings,
paranoia, auditory hallucinations, and, variously, visual
hallucinations. (AR 393, 396-99, 404, 407, 414, 420.) At
times, Plaintiff reported having anger outbursts, irritable
moods, poor concentration, and paranoid thoughts. (AR 397-98,
404, 406.) During the same period, Plaintiff also experienced
some improvements in his mood and condition. (AR 401, 410.)
Over the course of his assessments, Plaintiff remained
cooperative, coherent, and calm. (AR 393, 396-99, 401, 404,
407, 410-11, 416-17, 420.) Plaintiff experienced some relief
by using Zoloft and reported feeling good while compliant
with his medications. (AR 382, 399, 401, 410.) He was
diagnosed with psychotic disorder, NOS. (AR 402, 408, 412,
421, 423.) In July and August 2015, mental examinations also
revealed that his cognitive functions were at baseline
without existing deficits, and his insight and judgment were
fair. (AR 412, 418.) In October 2015, Plaintiff had a global
assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 40.
(AR 423.)
In June
2015, Plaintiff was evaluated by Ernest A. Bagner III, M.D.,
a board certified psychiatrist. (AR 388-92.) Plaintiff
reported that he experienced auditory hallucinations,
helplessness and hopelessness, fatigue, low motivation,
social withdrawal, anxiety, paranoia, and depression. (AR
388, 390.) Dr. Bagner reviewed Plaintiff's medical
records, including a 2013 report indicating that Plaintiff
had been diagnosed with a mood disorder, NOS. (AR 389.)
Plaintiff drank two bottles of alcohol per week.
(Id.) His mood was “nervous, ” his
affect was flat, he denied suicidal or homicidal thoughts,
and he did not exhibit looseness of association, thought
disorganization, flight of ideas, thought blocking,
tangentiality, or circumstantiality. (AR 390.) Dr. Bagner
diagnosed Plaintiff with polysubstance dependence; rule out
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; anti-social
personality disorder; and a GAF score of 60. (AR 391.)
Plaintiff's ability to follow simple instructions was
mildly limited; to follow detailed instruction was moderately
limited; to interact appropriately with the public,
co-workers, and supervisors was moderately limited due to
suspiciousness; to comply with job rules was not limited; to
respond to changes in routine work setting was mildly
limited; and to respond to work pressure in a usual work
setting was moderately limited to due paranoia.
(Id.) Plaintiff's daily activities were mildly
limited. (AR 392.) His prognosis was fair with polysubstance
rehabilitation. (Id.)
In
August 2015, state agency consultant Paula Kresser, Ph.D.,
evaluated Plaintiff's medical record in connection with
Plaintiff's initial disability determination. (AR 77-81.)
She first found that Plaintiff had a medically determinable
impairment in the form of schizophrenic, paranoid, and other
psychotic disorders. (AR 77.) Dr. Kresser found that
Plaintiff's medical symptoms could be reasonably expected
to produce his symptoms, but his statements about the
intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of
the symptoms were not substantiated by the objective medical
evidence alone. (AR 78.) She found Plaintiff “partially
credible, ” noting that despite allegations of
depression and auditory hallucinations, he was well-spoken,
able to bathe, cook, and shop, had a poor relationship with
his family, “fair” relationships with his
friends, and a long history of anxiety and psychotic disorder
and of substance abuse. (Id.) Dr. Kresser completed
a mental RFC assessment, concluding that Plaintiff was able
to understand, remember, and carry out simple one- and
two-step instructions; he could maintain concentration,
persistence, and pace for periods of two hours, perform work
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, be
punctual, complete a normal workday and workweek, and could
make simple work-related ...