United States District Court, E.D. California
ERNESTO LIMON, an individual, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
CIRCLE K STORES INC., and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(DOC. 27)
SHEILA
K. OBERTO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Circle K Stores, Inc.
(“Circle K”)'s motion for summary judgment
or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment, filed
November 20, 2019. (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff Ernesto Limon filed
his opposition to the motion on December 4, 2019 (Doc. 33),
and Circle K filed its reply on December 11, 2019. (Doc. 34.)
The Court reviewed the parties' papers and all supporting
material and found the matter suitable for decision without
oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The hearing set
for December 18, 2019, was therefore vacated. (Doc. 35.)
Having
considered the parties' briefing, and for the reasons set
forth below, the Court shall deny the motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
On June
21, 2018, Plaintiff completed a Circle K Employment
Application. (Doc. 33-1, Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (“SUMF”) at 3; Doc. 27-4, Deposition of
Ernesto Limon (“Limon Dep.”), Ex. 4.) In the
Application, when asked whether he “[w]ould . . . be
willing to submit to a background check, prior to being
hired, ” Plaintiff checked “yes.”
(Id. at 4; Limon Dep. 86:12-25 and Ex. 4.) Plaintiff
testified at his deposition that when he checked
“yes” in the employment application, he knew he
was informing Circle K of his willingness to submit to a
background check prior to being hired. (SUMF at 5; Limon Dep.
87:1-7.)
In
conjunction with the Employment Application, Plaintiff also
signed a document titled “Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) Consent.” (SUMF at 6; Limon Dep. 89:7-90:12 and
Ex. 5.) The FCRA Consent informed Plaintiff that a consumer
report containing his credit history, criminal records,
education history, and other information would be obtained
for employment purposes. (Limon Dep. Ex. 5.) The FCRA Consent
authorized Circle K to obtain Plaintiffs consumer report for
“legally authorized and mandated purposes.”
(Id.) It also authorized any person or entity
contacted by Circle K to provide Plaintiff s consumer report
and released “any such person or entity from liability
for furnishing such information.” (Id.; SUMF
at 10.) Plaintiff checked a box on the FCRA Consent
confirming his electronic signature on it and his
“agreement to [the document's] use in such
manner.” (Id.; Limon Dep. 89:7-90:12.) He also
checked a box on the FCRA Consent to request a copy of the
consumer report, and he received a copy of the report on June
28, 2018. (Id.; Limon Dep. 90:24-92:8 and Ex. 6;
SUMF at 9.) Plaintiff was thereafter hired by Circle K as a
customer service representative. (Limon Dep. 35:21-22.)
Plaintiff
states in his declaration that he was “confused by the
language” in Circle K's FCRA Consent form and
“did not understand everything in the form.”
(Doc. 33-4, Declaration of Ernesto Limon (“Limon
Decl.”) ¶ 7.) Plaintiff explains that he
“was confused and did not understand what [he] was
authorizing because the form language mentioned language
about release of liability and multiple other states that
were not applicable to me.” (Id. ¶ 8.) He
states that he “did not understand that by signing [he]
was waiving [his] rights in relation to Circle K and any
other person or entity providing background check
information.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff
further testified in his deposition that “a certain
portion of the application contract . . . gets a little
confusing and misleading, where . . . by signing that
portion, it pretty much would waive a certain right or
release.” (Limon Dep.114:2-7.)
B.
Procedural Background
Seeking
to represent a class of similarly situated applicants,
Plaintiff brings two claims under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”): (1) for failure to provide proper
disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Doc. 1
(“Compl.”) ¶¶ 51-56, and (2) for
failure to obtain proper authorization to obtain such a
report in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii),
Compl. ¶¶ 57-62. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Circle K's inclusion of the liability
release in its FCRA Consent form violated the statutory
requirement that the disclosure document consist
“solely” of the disclosure, which thereby
rendered his written authorization invalid, Compl.
¶¶ 21-22, 25-24. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii). Plaintiff contends that
Circle K's purported violations were willful and that he
and the putative class are therefore entitled to statutory
and punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
(Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37, 53, 59, 60.) He also
seeks attorney's fees and costs under the statute.
(Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 56, 62.)
Circle
K moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial
summary judgment, on three grounds: (1) Plaintiff cannot
establish Article III standing; (2) Circle K's alleged
statutory violations were not willful as a matter of law; and
(3) Plaintiff cannot prevail on his second FCRA claim because
he provided Circle K a signed written authorization. (Doc.
27.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The
“purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In addition, Rule 56 allows a
court to grant summary adjudication, or partial summary
judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to a claim or portion of that claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765,
769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 56 authorizes a summary
adjudication that will often fall short of a final
determination, even of a single claim ...”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that
apply on a motion for summary judgment and a motion for
summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F.Supp.2d
1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
Summary
judgment, or summary adjudication, should be entered
“after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving
party bears the “initial responsibility” of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is
genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
fact finder to find for the non-moving party, while a fact is
material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool
v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir.
1987). A party demonstrates summary adjudication is
appropriate by “informing the district court of the
basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of
‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
If the
moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts
to the opposing party to present specific facts that show
there is a genuine issue of a material fact. Fed R. Civ. P.
56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing
party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Id. at 587. The party is required to tender evidence
of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or
admissible discovery material, in support of its contention
that a factual dispute exits. Id. at 586 n.11;
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Further, the opposing party is not
required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively
in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed
factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to
resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at
trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific
Elec. Contractors Assoc, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th
Cir. 1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The
Court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to
determine whether the moving party demonstrated there is no
genuine issue of material fact and judgment is appropriate as
a matter of law. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983
F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). In resolving a motion for
summary judgment, the Court can only consider admissible
evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285
F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);
Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179,
1181 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, evidence must be viewed
“in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party” and “all justifiable inferences”
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr,
285 F.3d at 772; Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198
F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Evidence Before the Court
In
evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court examines
the evidence provided by the parties, including pleadings,
deposition testimony, answer to interrogatories, and
admissions on file. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a
motion for summary judgment, “[a] party may object that
the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be
presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The Court has
reviewed each of the evidentiary objections identified by the
parties related to the motion and opposition briefing.
(See Doc. 33-5; Doc. 34-2.) However, the Court
declines to address each of the individual objections
identified by the parties. See Capitol Records, LLC v.
BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (CD. Cal.
2010) (observing “it is often unnecessary and
impractical for a court to methodically scrutinize each
objection and give a full analysis of each argument
raised”).
To the
extent Circle K objects to evidence on the grounds of
relevance (see Doc. 34-2), such objections are
inappropriate because the Court must determine whether a fact
is relevant and material as part of “the summary
judgment standard itself.” Burch v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal,433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
To that end, any evidence deemed irrelevant was omitted from
the Court's summary of the facts and contentions above.
Further, the Court, as a matter of course, has not factored
into its analysis any statements identified by either party
that are speculative or represent a legal conclusion. See
Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119 (“statements in
declarations based on speculation or improper legal
conclusions, or argumentative statements, are not facts and
likewise will not be considered on a motion for summary
judgment.”) (citation omitted, ...