United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable Steve Kim, U.S. Magistrate Judge
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CHAMBERS) SCREENING ORDER 
is a pro se litigant (not in custody) who seeks to proceed in
forma pauperis with a civil rights complaint arising from his
July 2016 arrest and subsequent criminal prosecution. (ECF 1
at 13). Plaintiff claims that after he called 911 about a
death threat he received, Glendale police officers arrived at
his home to check on him, interrogated and searched him,
planted narcotics on him, and eventually arrested and charged
him with public intoxication and possession of illegal
substances. (Id. at 13-14). Plaintiff was later
acquitted of all charges. (Id. at 15). He has now
filed a discursive civil rights complaint against 21
Defendants- including the City of Glendale, Los Angeles City
and County, various Glendale police officers, Los Angeles
city attorneys, public defenders, court clerks, and a state
court judge-alleging 67 causes of action. (Id. at
1-4). But because Plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court must screen his complaint to determine
whether, among other things, it states a claim on which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). As currently pled, Plaintiffs complaint does not
survive this screening standard.
begin with, the complaint violates the pleading requirements
of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule
8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief," so that Defendants are given fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests.
"[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of
action's elements will not do." Bell Ad. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To state a claim on which relief may be
granted, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But the 88-page complaint here lists 67
causes of action by parroting general elements of federal and
state law claims without any supporting facts. Plaintiff
fails to allege the basic who, what, when, where, and why of
his claims against Defendants. The complaint does not even
mention any Defendants by name in the facts section. (See ECF
1 at 12-16). Nor can this Court discern what reason Plaintiff
has for suing his public defenders, a state court judge, or a
court clerk, all of whom will almost certainly be insulated
by legal immunity. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467
U.S. 914, 920 (1984); Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 325 (1981). And Plaintiff has alleged no facts
suggesting that the City of Glendale or the County and City
of Los Angeles had a widespread policy, custom, or practice
that violated his constitutional rights. See Oviatt ex
rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing requirements for suing municipality
entities properly). In short, Plaintiffs complaint, as
currently pled, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. See Gottschalk v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 964 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(dismissing action because Plaintiff failed to clarify which
claims were brought against which Defendants and articulate a
factual basis for any of her claims; these deficiencies ran
"afoul of the requirements of both Rule 8(a) and Rule
12(b)(6), particularly in light of Twombly and
even if Plaintiff had complied with Rule 8's pleading
requirements, over half of the alleged causes of causes of
action asserted in his complaint are without merit because
they are based on federal and state criminal statutes that do
not give rise to civil liability. (See ECF 1 at 2). Criminal
provisions that provide no basis for civil liability do not
create a civil cause of action. See Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980); see
also Keyter v. McCain, 207 Fed.Appx. 801, 802 (9th Cir.
2006) (dismissal of claims "based on federal criminal
statutes because statutes that provide for punishment by fine
or imprisonment do not create privately enforceable rights or
give rise to civil liability."). So the numerous claims
based on federal and state criminal statutes in Plaintiffs
complaint-even if they had factual allegations to support
them-would be subject to dismissal.
while it appears that the Complaint could have stated
cognizable claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Glendale police
officers in their individual capacities, see Awabdy v.
City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004);
Caldwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 889
F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018); Dubner v. City and
County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.
2001), these claims are in any event untimely. The events
alleged in Plaintiffs complaint occurred between July 2016
(when Plaintiff was arrested) and November 2017 (when
Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges). (ECF 1 at 13-14). So
Plaintiff had to bring any claims alleging constitutional
violations based on these events within two years. See
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)
(section 1983 suit in California federal court has two-year
statute of limitations). But Plaintiff did not file this
action until December 2019, more than two years after he had
been acquitted of all charges. As a result, any viable §
1983 claims asserted in Plaintiffs complaint are time-barred.
without any actionable federal claims to address, the Court
should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
cognizable state law claims Plaintiff may have. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). He can always sue
for those state law claims in state court.
these reasons, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or
before January 27. 2020.why his in forma pauperis application
should not be denied and this action dismissed because of the
legal and factual deficiencies outlined above. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
If Plaintiff cannot cure these deficiencies, he may
voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice using the
attached form CV-09. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a
First Amended Complaint curing all these deficiencies and
meeting the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 12(b)(6).
If Plaintiff fails to take one of these actions on time, this
action may be dismissed involuntarily in its entirety for
failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b);
L.R. 41-1. If Plaintiff files either an amended complaint
that does not cure the deficiencies described in
this order or a response standing on the original complaint
as alleged, the Court will recommend that claims and
Defendants be dismissed without leave to amend
consistent with this order.
 This order is non-dispositive, so it
is not immediately appealable. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); McKeever v.
Block,932 F.2d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 1991). If Plaintiff
believes this order is dispositive, he must object to the
order within 14 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a),
(b); L.R. 72-2.1; Simpson ...