United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CAROLYN K. DELANEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for
violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May
8, 2019, the court screened plaintiff's second amended
complaint as the court is required to do under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a) and found that plaintiff could proceed on two
claims arising under the First Amendment. The remaining
defendants, Berlier, Bouldin, Woodman and Melgarejo, have
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
When
considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations
as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Review is generally limited to the
complaint. Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d
1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993). Of course, the court
“draw[s] on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009).
An
exception to the rule that review is generally limited to the
contents of the complaint is that the court can consider
judicially noticed facts pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A fact which can be judicially
noticed is a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute
because it (1) is generally known within the trial
court's jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned.”
1.
Computer Printouts
In his
second amended complaint, plaintiff asserts that on September
5, 2017, while housed at the Glenn County Jail, he was
informed that mail addressed to him was returned to the
sender by defendant Berlier because the mail included
printouts from a computer.[1] Plaintiff alleges that the jail policy
of not permitting inmates to possess computer printouts was
initiated by Lt. Bouldin.[2]
In
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-409 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that “[t]he addressee as well as
the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the
First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against
unjustified governmental interference with the intended
communication.” With respect to prisoner mail, any
interference must be “reasonably related to legitimate
penological needs.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 413 (1989).
Nothing
in plaintiff's second amended complaint suggests that any
legitimate penological interest, such as correctional safety,
is furthered by a blanket ban on all computer printouts. This
being the case, defendants' motion to dismiss should be
denied with respect to plaintiff's claim that he was
denied correspondence simply because it included such
material. In a motion for summary judgment, defendants are
free to point to evidence indicating that a blanket ban is
reasonably related to legitimate penological needs, or to
evidence indicating that the material which was returned is
not protected under the First Amendment.[3]
2.
Spiral Binding
Plaintiff
also claims that on December 4, 2017, he was informed by
defendant Woodman that he had received mail from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
California. However, Woodman told plaintiff that plaintiff
would not be permitted to possess the material which was
received because it had a “spiral binding.”
Woodman told plaintiff the material would be placed with
plaintiff's property. On December 6, 2017, plaintiff
received written notice from defendant Melgarejo that the
mail from the Northern District was rejected by defendant LT.
Bouldin because it had a spiral binding. At that point, the
mail was returned to the Northern District.
The
court understands that jail officials have a legitimate
safety concern with inmates possessing material with stiff
metal spiral binding. But, the court questions whether a
blanket ban on all spiral binding, including more malleable
plastic, could serve a valid purpose. Further, banning the
material with the spiral binding altogether, rather than
removing the binding and allowing the inmate to possess what
remains, appears to be an overreaction. In any case, nothing
in plaintiff's second amended complaint suggests that any
legitimate penological interest, such as correctional safety,
is furthered by a blanket ban on all material with spiral
bindings.
3.
Qualified Immunity
Finally,
defendants argue plaintiff's remaining claims are barred
by the “qualified immunity” doctrine.
“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from
civil damages unless their conduct violates ‘clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.'” Jeffers
v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In
analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the court must
consider the following: (1) whether the alleged facts, taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate
that defendant's conduct violated a statutory or
constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was
clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
As
indicated above, plaintiff has a clearly established right to
receive mail while incarcerated and any limitation on the
material plaintiff can receive must be “reasonably
related to legitimate penological needs.” This right
was clearly established at the time plaintiff alleges his
First Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, none of
the defendants are immune from ...