United States District Court, E.D. California
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (ECF NO. 14)
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Floyd Foster, a California state inmate, is proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“§ 1983”).
While
awaiting disposition of state law charges of driving under
the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), Plaintiff
attempted to post bail in the matter. ECF No. 13 at
5-6.[1]
Plaintiff alleges his attempts to secure his release came
after the court granted the state's request to withdraw a
related parole violation and ordered on October 27, 2017,
that Plaintiff be released on the withdrawn violation.
Id. Plaintiff contends that he was unable to post
bail in the DUI matter because the state parole agent present
in court for the parole violation withdrawal did not take the
steps necessary to release the parole hold. Id. at
6. Plaintiff states that the agent's failure to act
continued even after being ordered a subsequent time by the
state court to take the steps necessary to lift the parole
hold. Id. Ultimately, the parole hold was not lifted
until after a hearing on July 3, 2018, in which the parole
agent allegedly admitted her culpability for Plaintiff's
failed release from the parole hold. Id. Plaintiff
contends he was unable to post bail in the DUI matter at that
point because he no longer had the resources in place to do
so. Id. On July 18, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this
action for excessive custody. ECF No. 1. The matter was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
On
October 23, 2019, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and
recommendations (“F&Rs”) recommending that
the second amended complaint (“SAC”) be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim. ECF
No. 14. The F&Rs were served on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff
filed objections on November 18, 2019. ECF No. 15. In
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo
review of this case, and for purposes of the review, accepts
Plaintiff's allegations of fact as true. The Court
declines to adopt the F&Rs for the reasons discussed
below, and while the decision is close, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's SAC states a cognizable claim.
The
F&Rs found that Plaintiff's allegations are
insufficient because, under the analysis employed, the
allegations fail to demonstrate anything beyond mere
negligence on the part of the parole agent even if all facts
alleged are proven true. ECF No. 14 at 8. The F&Rs reason
that “Plaintiff was in custody on the new law
violations” and the parole agent was “aware that
new charges had been filed against Plaintiff and he was
detained on those charges, ” concluding that
“Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would
indicate” that the parole agent “knew or should
have known” that Plaintiff was unable to post bail due
to the parole hold and failed to act. ECF No. 14 at 7-8.
However,
two issues must be considered. First, Plaintiff's SAC
alleges the Court reissued the relevant parole withdrawal
minute order and sent a copy “to all parties, ”
as the F&Rs note. ECF Nos. 13 at 6, 14 at 8. Whether
mailed or delivered electronically through a court computer
system, if that notice was directed at or forwarded to the
parole agent in question as alleged, it could constitute
evidence that the parole agent knew or should have known that
the parole hold continued in place even after the parole
violation was withdrawn and Plaintiff was ordered released on
it. Courts do not routinely reissue orders without reason,
and the reissuance of that order may be a
“circumstance” indicating to the parole agent
that “further investigation was warranted”-if the
parole agent was or should have been aware of the order.
Gant v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 621 (9th
Cir. 2014). As no discovery has occurred, it is impossible on
this record to determine whether the parole agent received
the reissued minute order.
Second,
this potential notice must be contextualized. Because of the
duties and authority of parole agents, this case arguably is
unlike Chavez v. City of Petaluma, No.
14-CV-05038-MEJ, 2015 WL 3766460 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2015),
cited in the F&Rs for the proposition that dismissal of a
complaint is warranted when the complaint fails to show that
a named defendant knew or had reason to know that an arrestee
was improperly detained on a parole hold.
In
Chavez, the court dismissed a § 1983 parole
hold claim against a county and its sheriff reasoning in part
that the plaintiff alleged “no facts indicating that
the [county or its sheriff] understood the situation [the
plaintiff] was in or that they denied him an opportunity to
be heard.” No. 14-CV-05038-MEJ, 2015 WL 3766460, at *7.
In other words, the court found that the county and its
sheriff did not know or have reason to know that the
plaintiff was improperly detained. The court further noted
plaintiff's concession that neither the sheriff nor the
county decides who is or is not on parole. Id.
Therefore, dismissal of the parole hold claim
vis-à-vis the county and the sheriff was appropriate.
Id.
However,
in Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp.2d 903, 915-918 (C.D.
Cal. 2004), the court denied in part a defense motion for
summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact based on
the plaintiff's assertions that he had verbally informed
jail staff that his parole hold had been lifted and that he
had filed a grievance about the hold. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff's verbal and written complaints could
conceivably constitute evidence that the deputies knowingly
failed to investigate the plaintiff's detention.
Id. Notably in Green, a supervising parole
agent explained that it was the duty of the parole
agency's staff to transmit notice of a parole hold's
release to the relevant detention facility.[2] Id. at
905-06. Because that notice allegedly was transmitted in
Green, the court did not address potential liability
on the part of the parole agency or its staff. Id.
at 905-06, 911-12.
Unlike
a jail or prison, the essential duties of a parole agency
revolve around the parole status of each parolee
under its supervision. True, Plaintiff was held on bail for
new charges, a circumstance that might make more difficult
ascertainment of an error in lifting a parole hold, but a
parole agency is not exempted from knowing which parolee is
or is not in being held on a parole violation simply because
other circumstances might cloud the picture. Plaintiff's
averment that the parole agent received a second
communication from the court regarding his parole hold must
be viewed in this context, which reinforces the salience of
point one-that a reissued, pertinent minute order may be a
circumstance indicating to the parole agent that further
investigation of a parolee's status is warranted.
For
these reasons, the Court concludes that, while a close
decision, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
In
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo
review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire
file, the Court declines to adopt the F&Rs and finds that
plaintiff's ...