Thomas v. Quality Loan Service Corp.

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 17]

          HOP. CYNTHIA BASHANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Rudie Thomas is a litigant familiar to this Court. In 2014, he was declared a vexatious litigant with respect to the repeated lawsuits he filed against Bank of America following foreclosure of his property located at 5048 Crescent Bay. (See 13-cv-1576-LAB-JLB, ECF No. 24.) In that case, Chief Judge Burns enjoined Mr. Thomas from filing any further civil actions against Bank of America with respect to foreclosure of his home without approval of the court.

         Astonishingly, in 2016, Mr. Thomas was issued another mortgage on a property located at 3771 Coleman Avenue. When Wells Fargo Bank foreclosed on this property, Mr. Thomas commenced legal proceedings against Wells Fargo Bank in San Diego Superior Court. Upon losing his case in state court, he now files this case against Quality Loan Service Corp. (“QLS”), the trustee on the Wells Fargo Bank foreclosure sale.

         In the Superior Court case Mr. Thomas alleged: (1) Wells Fargo Bank did not have the right to foreclose on his Coleman Avenue property because the note was forged, (2) Wells Fargo Bank was not properly assigned the Deed of Trust, and (3) Wells Fargo Bank did not properly substitute Quality Loan Service Corp. as the trustee under the Deed of Trust. The San Diego Superior Court found all of these claims lacked merit, ruling:

It is undisputed that plaintiff entered into the subject loan transaction, accepted the loan funds and purchased the property, moved into the property and made payments to Wells Fargo. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Wells Fargo was properly assigned the Deed of Trust and properly substituted in Quality Loan Service Corp. as the foreclosure trustee.

Thomas v. Wells Fargo Home, Cas No. 37-2016-00019344-CU-OR-CTL. (See ECF No. 7-2, at 39.)

         Plaintiff filed this federal case against QLS, and in his original complaint he alleged numerous causes of action, including violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The Court dismissed certain causes of action with prejudice and others without prejudice. (“Prior Order, ” ECF No. 15, at 16-17.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time bringing causes of action under the False Claims Act (specifically, section 3729(a)(1)(B)) and California Civil Code section 2924(A)(6). (First Amended Complaint, “FAC, ” ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff also requests declaratory judgment declaring the status of the Coleman Avenue property. Plaintiff requests $15, 375, 463.90 in damages.

         Defendant QLS again moves to dismiss the complaint, (“Mot., ” ECF No. 17). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (ECF No. 19.)^[1] The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.

         I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

         Plaintiff alleges he is the owner of a property located at 3771 Coleman Avenue in San Diego. (FAC ¶ 1.) A deed of trust dated August 26, 2014 indicates Plaintiff obtained a loan of $356, 385 secured by a Deed of Trust against the property located at 3771 Coleman Avenue. The deed of trust lists Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the nominal beneficiary for Moria Development, Inc. (ECF No. 16-1, at 2.)^[2] On December 29, 2015, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded, and Defendant QLS was named as trustee. (ECF No. 16-3, at 19.)

         On December 31, 2015, Defendant recorded a Notice of Default. (Id. at 22.) On April 4, 2016, Defendant recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale due to Plaintiff's unpaid balance. (ECF No. 16-4, at 56.) On May 13, 2016, Defendant recorded a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale. (Id. at 59.)

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         A complaint must plead sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

         A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of ...