United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF
NO. 17]
HOP.
CYNTHIA BASHANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Rudie Thomas is a litigant familiar to this Court. In 2014,
he was declared a vexatious litigant with respect to the
repeated lawsuits he filed against Bank of America following
foreclosure of his property located at 5048 Crescent Bay.
(See 13-cv-1576-LAB-JLB, ECF No. 24.) In that case,
Chief Judge Burns enjoined Mr. Thomas from filing any further
civil actions against Bank of America with respect to
foreclosure of his home without approval of the court.
Astonishingly,
in 2016, Mr. Thomas was issued another mortgage on a property
located at 3771 Coleman Avenue. When Wells Fargo Bank
foreclosed on this property, Mr. Thomas commenced legal
proceedings against Wells Fargo Bank in San Diego Superior
Court. Upon losing his case in state court, he now files this
case against Quality Loan Service Corp. (“QLS”),
the trustee on the Wells Fargo Bank foreclosure sale.
In the
Superior Court case Mr. Thomas alleged: (1) Wells Fargo Bank
did not have the right to foreclose on his Coleman Avenue
property because the note was forged, (2) Wells Fargo Bank
was not properly assigned the Deed of Trust, and (3) Wells
Fargo Bank did not properly substitute Quality Loan Service
Corp. as the trustee under the Deed of Trust. The San Diego
Superior Court found all of these claims lacked merit,
ruling:
It is undisputed that plaintiff entered into the subject loan
transaction, accepted the loan funds and purchased the
property, moved into the property and made payments to Wells
Fargo. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Wells Fargo
was properly assigned the Deed of Trust and properly
substituted in Quality Loan Service Corp. as the foreclosure
trustee.
Thomas v. Wells Fargo Home, Cas No.
37-2016-00019344-CU-OR-CTL. (See ECF No. 7-2, at
39.)
Plaintiff
filed this federal case against QLS, and in his original
complaint he alleged numerous causes of action, including
violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The Court
dismissed certain causes of action with prejudice and others
without prejudice. (“Prior Order, ” ECF No. 15,
at 16-17.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend.
(Id.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this
time bringing causes of action under the False Claims Act
(specifically, section 3729(a)(1)(B)) and California Civil
Code section 2924(A)(6). (First Amended Complaint,
“FAC, ” ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff also requests
declaratory judgment declaring the status of the Coleman
Avenue property. Plaintiff requests $15, 375, 463.90 in
damages.
Defendant
QLS again moves to dismiss the complaint, (“Mot.,
” ECF No. 17). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (ECF No.
19.)[1]
The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the
papers and without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For
the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS
Defendant's Motion.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff
alleges he is the owner of a property located at 3771 Coleman
Avenue in San Diego. (FAC ¶ 1.) A deed of trust dated
August 26, 2014 indicates Plaintiff obtained a loan of $356,
385 secured by a Deed of Trust against the property located
at 3771 Coleman Avenue. The deed of trust lists Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as
the nominal beneficiary for Moria Development, Inc. (ECF No.
16-1, at 2.)[2] On December 29, 2015, a Substitution of
Trustee was recorded, and Defendant QLS was named as trustee.
(ECF No. 16-3, at 19.)
On
December 31, 2015, Defendant recorded a Notice of Default.
(Id. at 22.) On April 4, 2016, Defendant recorded a
Notice of Trustee's Sale due to Plaintiff's unpaid
balance. (ECF No. 16-4, at 56.) On May 13, 2016, Defendant
recorded a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale. (Id. at
59.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
complaint must plead sufficient factual allegations to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
A
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the
claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6);
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the
complaint as true and must construe them and draw all
reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving
party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,
337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack
of a cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of
...