United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
DAVID
O. CARTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff,
who is presently being held at the Ventura County Jail, filed
this pro se civil rights action on December 23,
2019, and she appears to wish to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). However, plaintiff neither
paid the required filing fee nor filed a Request to Proceed
IFP. In her pleading, plaintiff does not set forth any
claims, identify any defendants, or seek relief (other than
her release from custody). As set forth below, the pleading
fails to allege any arguable basis in either fact or law for
a federal civil rights claim and fails to set forth a short
and plain statement of any claim. See Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
The
Court has screened the pleading to determine whether it is
frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2) pertains to
any civil action by a litigant who is seeking to proceed
in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Shirley v. Univ.
of Idaho, 800 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015). In
screening the Complaint to determine whether plaintiff's
pleading states a claim on which relief may be granted, the
Court “discount[s] conclusory statements, which are not
entitled to the presumption of truth, before determining
whether a claim is plausible.” Salameh v. Tarsadia
Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015)
(in determining whether a complaint should be dismissed under
28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), courts apply the standard of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). A trial court may also dismiss a
claim sua sponte where the claimant may not possibly
obtain relief. See Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813
F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987).
Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have subject
matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the
Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). It is
this Court's duty to examine its own subject matter
jurisdiction, see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006), and the Court may dismiss a case summarily
if there is an obvious jurisdictional issue. See
Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Grp.,
Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003). “Absent a
substantial federal question, ” a district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, and claims that are
“wholly insubstantial” or “obviously
frivolous” are insufficient to “raise a
substantial federal question for jurisdictional
purposes.” Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S.Ct. 450,
455-56 (2015). A “plaintiff bears the burden of
proving” the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
and “must allege facts, not mere legal
conclusions” to support the court's jurisdiction.
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.
2014).
Plaintiff's
pleading consists of a large post card with handwritten
phrases on both sides. No. defendants are named, and no
intelligible claims are stated. Plaintiff has written
incomplete and often incomprehensible notes on one side of
the postcard, including “I need justice!”;
“Save me!”; “murder on the inside”;
“Get me out of custody!”; “Secret Service
Winslow”; etc. On the reverse side of the postcard,
plaintiff references “numerous FBI agents, CIA Agents,
LA County Courts, LAPD Rhonda Spinnaker, Kathy Wiggins,
Gregory Totten, ” a public defender, “Judge
George Romero, ” and “Andrea Haney.”
Plaintiff alleges that someone is “keeping [her]
hostage, ” and that someone has been “trying to
set [her] up or have [her] killed.” (ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff
references the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which is a
state entity. See, e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council on
Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding that a civil rights action against a
California Superior Court is a suit against the State and
thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment). The Eleventh
Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals
against a State and its instrumentalities or agencies, unless
either the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity or
Congress abrogates it. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). To overcome
this Eleventh Amendment bar, the State's consent or
Congress' intent must be “unequivocally
expressed.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. While
California has consented to be sued in its own courts
pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, such consent does
not constitute consent to suit in federal court. See BV
Eng'g v. Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d
1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). Finally, Congress has not
repealed state sovereign immunity against suits brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court does not have
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against state
agencies.
Plaintiff
also references the FBI and CIA. As a general rule, the
United States enjoys sovereign immunity, and this immunity
extends to federal agencies and officers acting in their
official capacities. Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity
shields the federal government and its agencies from suit,
and absent that waiver, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear
claims against the United States. Gilbert v.
DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“[T]he bar of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided by
naming officers and employees of the United States as
defendants.”). The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars
suits against the United States, its agencies, and its
employees in their official capacities. See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Gilbert, 756
F.2d at 1458-59 (suits against officers and employees of the
United States in their official capacities are barred by
sovereign immunity absent an explicit waiver). Accordingly,
plaintiff may not bring any federal constitutional claims
against any federal agency or any federal employee in his or
her official capacity because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over such claims.
Further,
plaintiff presently is in custody and appears to be seeking
release from such custody. However, a petition for habeas
corpus is a prisoner's sole judicial remedy when
attacking “the validity of the fact or length of
… confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907
F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, plaintiff may not use a
civil rights action to challenge the validity or duration of
a conviction or incarceration. Such relief only is available
in a habeas corpus action.[1]
Plaintiff
also appears to mention multiple public defenders. To the
extent that plaintiff purports to raise a federal civil
rights claim against a public defender who has represented
plaintiff in criminal proceedings, such individuals are not
acting under color of state law. To “state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and [she] must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The
“under-color-of-state-law” requirement
“excludes” from the reach of § 1983 all
“merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory
or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A private individual, such as an attorney,
may be considered to be acting under color of state law only
if a private party intentionally engages in joint action with
a state official to deprive someone of a constitutional
right. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). An
attorney, even if appointed by a court or government entity,
is a private party who does not act under color of state law.
See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19,
n.9, 325 (1981) (“a lawyer representing a client is
not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state
actor ‘under color of state law' within the meaning
of §1983, ” regardless of “whether the
lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a
legal aid or defender program”); Miranda v. Clark
County, 319 F.3d 465, 468-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(a public defender performing the role of an attorney for a
client is not a state actor under §1983). Accordingly,
plaintiff may not raise a federal civil rights claim against
her public defenders.
Finally,
plaintiff alleges that someone has been “keeping [her]
hostage, ” “money all the way around, ” and
“murder on the inside.” Such allegations are not
complete or intelligible as presented, and they “rise
to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.
In sum,
plaintiffs allegations herein are disjointed, incoherent and
fail to plausibly allege that any defendant acted under color
of state law to deprive her of a right guaranteed under the
United States Constitution or a federal statute. For these
reasons, plaintiffs allegations lack an arguable basis in
fact or law to assert a federal civil rights claim, and the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
IT
THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this action is dismissed
without prejudice.
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