United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 9, 10)
KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of Social Security denying his application for Title II
disability insurance benefits.[1] In his summary judgment motion,
Plaintiff primarily contends the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in weighing medical evidence and
testimony regarding Plaintiff's physical and mental
impairments, erred in formulating Plaintiff's residual
functional capacity, and erred in finding Plaintiff could
perform past work. The Commissioner opposed and filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment.
After
considering the parties' written briefing, the record,
and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, DENIES
Plaintiff's motion, and AFFIRMS the decision.
I.
BACKGROUND AND ALJ'S FIVE-STEP
ANALYSIS[2]
Plaintiff
applied for supplemental security income on March 4, 2015,
alleging an onset date of January 1, 2012. (Administrative
Transcript (“AT”) 197.) Plaintiff claimed the
following medical conditions: “Neuropathy in legs
(severe pain). Diabetes. Hepatitis C, Back Pain, Sleeping
problems. Hearing loss. Chronic pain. Panic attacks.
Anxiety.” (AT 121, 133.) Plaintiff's application
was denied initially and again upon reconsideration.
(Id.) Plaintiff, aided by an attorney, sought review
of these denials with an ALJ. (AT 140-41.) At an April 12,
2017 hearing, Plaintiff testified about his conditions, and
the ALJ heard testimony from a vocational expert regarding
Plaintiff's ability to work. (AT 37-92.)
On
September 6, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision determining that
Plaintiff was not disabled for the relevant period. (AT
21-30.) At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1,
2012. (AT 23.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff to have
had the following severe impairments: “lumbar
degenerative disk disease with radiculopathy, peripheral
neuropathy, diabetes mellitus, bilateral hearing loss, right
shoulder impingement, and obesity.” (Id.)
However, the ALJ determined at step three that these
impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of a
listed impairment. (AT 25).
Based
on this information, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “a
reduced range of light work, with the following exceptions:
[H]e can lift carry push or pull 20 pounds occasionally and
10 pounds frequently; he can sit for eight hours of an
eight-hour workday with normal breaks, but he requires a
sit/stand option at the workstation and can sit for 30 to 40
minutes before he has to change positions by standing up; he
can stand and walk for six hours of an eight-hour workday
with normal breaks, but he cannot engage in prolonged
standing or walking-specifically he can stand or walk for 20
to 30 minutes at a time and then needs a change in position;
he can occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl, or kneel; he c an
never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can frequently
work above the right shoulder, and he has no limitations on
the left shoulder; he can occasionally operate foot pedals;
he cannot work in an area with loud noise-that is noisier
than the standard office-without ear protection; he cannot
work at unprotected heights or around unprotected hazardous
machinery; he can receive, remember, understand, and carry
out both simple and detailed job instructions; he can
frequently follow complex instructions; he can interact with
the public coworkers and supervisors; he can adjust to
changes in the workplace, and he can make workplace
judgments.
(AT 25, cleaned up.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ
stated that this included considering Plaintiff's
expressed symptoms, the objective medical evidence in the
record, and the opinion evidence given by the examining and
consulting physicians. (AT 23-29.) Relevant here, the ALJ
found that the moderate-to-severe limitations occasionally
opined upon by an examining physician, a physician's
assistant, and others were unsupported by the medical
evidence and otherwise inconsistent with the remaining
medical record. Further, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's
claims of severity of his impairments, and similarly
discounted Plaintiff's wife's statements. (AT 27,
29.) Based on Plaintiff's background, testimony, earnings
record, and the testimony of the Vocational Expert, the ALJ
concluded at step four that Plaintiff was capable of
performing past work as a manager of land development. (AT
29-30.)
On
October 17, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
appeal. (AT 1-7.) Plaintiff then timely filed this action
requesting judicial review of the Commissioner's final
decision, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (ECF Nos. 1, 9, 10, 11.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Court reviews the Commissioner's decision de novo, and
should reverse “only if the ALJ's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or
if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Buck
v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017).
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less
than a preponderance; i.e. “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is responsible for
determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Id. The
court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion where “the
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, the court may not
reverse the ALJ's decision on account of harmless error.
Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Plaintiff
alleges multiple errors on the ALJ's part, including
assigning error:
A. at step 2 by failing to include Plaintiff's anxiety,
hearing loss, obesity, or diabetes as severe conditions;
B. in discounting the more-moderate mental and physical
limitations opined upon by various medical professionals;
C. in discounting the statements made by Plaintiff and his
wife concerning the severity of Plaintiff's symptoms;
D. in forming the RFC without; and
E. at step 4 by improperly finding that Plaintiff could
return to his prior work.
In his
brief, Plaintiff asserts additional errors, which the Court
discusses at various points below. Plaintiff requests either
a remand for benefits or further proceedings. (ECF No. 9.)
The
Commissioner counters each of Plaintiff's arguments,
contending that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's
assessment of Plaintiff's mental functions. Thus, the
Commissioner maintains the ALJ's opinion should be
affirmed. (ECF No. 24.)
IV.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Evaluation of Medical Source Opinions
The
weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether
they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining
professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d
821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, a treating
physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining
physician's opinion, and an examining physician's
opinion carries more weight than a non-examining
physician's opinion. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202.
The medical opinion of a claimant's treating doctor is
given “controlling weight” so long as it
“is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case
record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). When a
treating doctor's opinion is not controlling, it is
weighted ...