United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
CYNTHIA BASHANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Tremayne Carroll, a state prisoner incarcerated at the R.J.
Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San
Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner seeks a
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
asserting that he is in danger of continued physical and
sexual assault at RJD and other California correctional
institutions. (Id. at 20.) He seeks placement in a
safe federal institution, review of prior rules violations,
restoration of custody credits, and the return of his
property. (Id.) For the reasons stated below, the
Court DISMISSES the Petition without
contends that he has been physically and sexually assaulted
by staff, has been assaulted by other inmates at the behest
of staff, has been denied fair hearings and the right to
appeal in connection with falsified rules violations, has had
his property confiscated or given away, has falsely been
labeled a sex offender or child molester by staff, and has
suffered seizures due to his treatment and the lack of ADA
compliance, noting that he is in a wheelchair and suffers
from numerous physical impairments. (Pet. at 1-20.)
Petitioner seeks injunctive relief and a temporary
restraining order, arguing that he is in danger of continued
physical or sexual assault by inmates at numerous
institutions including RJD, that he should have custody
credits restored, his property returned, have the rules
violations and classifications independently reviewed, and
should be placed in “safe” federal custody.
(Id. at 20.)
a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of
his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Meanwhile, “a
§ 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner
who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of
his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his
custody.” Id. at 499.
review of the Petition, it appears that habeas corpus is not
the proper avenue for Petitioner's claims. The majority
of Petitioner's claims and his requests for injunctive
relief and a temporary restraining order, a move to another
facility, return of property, and review of violations and
classifications, appear to be challenges to the conditions of
his prison life, and would not “necessarily”
impact the length of his custody. Nettles, 830 F.3d
v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2016);
see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499. Petitioner's
instant claims therefore fall outside the core of habeas
corpus and must be brought in section 1983.
restoration of custody credits could conceivably fall within
habeas review if it were to result in immediate or earlier
release from custody, “[i]f the invalidity of the
disciplinary proceedings, and therefore the restoration of
good-time credits, would not necessarily affect the length of
time to be served, then the claim falls outside the core of
habeas and may be brought in § 1983.”
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929 (citing Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754-55 (2004)). Petitioner does not
offer specifics as to the rules violations suffered or the
resultant loss of credits and does not allege that such
relief, if granted, would result in his earlier or immediate
release from imprisonment; the record reflects that
Petitioner is serving a sentence of 25 years to life for
grand theft auto, a third strike offense. (See Pet.
Petitioner's claims, as pled, are not cognizable in
habeas review, the Ninth Circuit has provided that “a
district court may construe a petition for habeas corpus to
plead a cause of action under § 1983 after notifying and
obtaining informed consent from the prisoner.”
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (“‘If the
complaint is amenable to conversion on its face, meaning that
it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief,
the court may recharacterize the petition so long as it warns
the pro se litigant of the consequences of the
conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to
withdraw or amend his or her complaint.'”) (quoting
Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir.
2005)). However, the Court declines to construe
Petitioner's case as a § 1983 action.
Petitioner has named the warden of the institution where he
is currently confined and the State of California as
Respondents in this action, but the State of California is
not a proper party to a civil rights suit. See Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69
(“§ 1983 actions do not lie against a
State.”) (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Moreover, Petitioner
does not make any specific allegations against the warden.
Instead, with respect to incidents at RJD, for instance,
Petitioner generally alleges that “RJD made Dr.
Calderon my doctor” despite complaints Petitioner had
against him, that he “was physically and sexually
assaulted by staff, ” that “RJD falsified a RVR,
” and that “RJD paid inmates to attack me several
times, ” without identifying the individuals involved.
(Pet. at 13-14). These allegations are insufficient for
conversion to a § 1983 action. See Leer v.
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The
inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on
the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant
whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a
constitutional deprivation.”) (citing Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).
a review of Petitioner's litigation history reflects that
“Tremayne Deon Carroll, also known as Tremaine Carroll,
and identified as CDCR Inmate #H-73384, has had three prior
prisoner civil actions dismissed on the ground that they were
frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Carroll v. Ahboot,
Civil Case No. 16-cv-01853-LAB-MDD, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14,
2016) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing
Action for Failure to Pay Filing Fee and For Lack of Proper
Venue, ECF No. 3 (taking judicial notice of records and
proceedings in Southern and Eastern Districts of
California).) As such, the Court also declines to convert the
Petition into a civil rights complaint because it might
expose Petitioner to the PLRA, which would bar him from
proceeding in forma pauperis, and would make the
civil filing fee payable in full upon filing, unless he
demonstrates that he “is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g); see also Bruce v. Samuels, __U.S.__, 136
S.Ct. 627, 630 (2016).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that:
“If it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. In
this case, it is plain from the Petition that Petitioner is
not presently entitled to federal habeas relief because he
has not alleged that the potential restoration of ...