United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER OF SERVICE
M. RYU JUDGE
a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State
Prison - Sacramento, has filed a pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from
alleged constitutional violations that occurred while he was
incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison ("PBSP").
has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, and this
matter has been assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
Dkt. 1 at 4.
has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Dkt. 4. His previously-filed request for appointment of
counsel has also been denied. Id.
is proper because the events giving rise to the claims are
alleged to have occurred at PBSP, which is located in this
judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
complaint, Plaintiff states the following claims: (1)
excessive force stemming from a June 4, 2015 incident; (2)
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on
a denial of medical attention following the June 4, 2015
incident; and (3) state law claims for negligence. Plaintiff
names the following Defendants, who are prison officials at
PBSP: Correctional Officers J. Vangilder and J. Vasquez;
Lieutenants S. Cupp and K. Ohland; Sergeant J. Cuske; and
Captain D. Melton. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and
Standard of Review
federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any
case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must
identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally
construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Excessive Force and Deliberate Indifference to Serious
alleges that on June 4, 2015, he was the victim of excessive
force and that he was subsequently denied medical care. Dkt.
1 at 8-15.
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions
under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
31 (1993). "After incarceration, only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
(ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). With respect to excessive force, the core judicial
inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). But not every malevolent touch by a
prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.
Id. at 9. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of